











# Colonies and Dependencies

THE ENGLISH CITIZEN:  
*HIS RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.*

# COLONIES AND DEPENDENCIES

## PART I.—INDIA

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## CHAPTER

### INTRODUCTION.

THE connection between England and India is a political anomaly that has no parallel in history. We sometimes talk of "our Indian fellow-subjects;" but such a phrase is altogether misleading. The Queen of England is, by right of her English crown and by Act of the English Parliament, Empress of India. And natives of India, if they happen to sojourn in this country, are not aliens. There seems no reason why they should not be registered as parliamentary electors; they might even be returned as members of the House of Commons. As far, Englishmen and Indians stand in a similar relation to a common monarch, and share in one great empire. But their relation to that monarch is not identical, nor are they equal sharers in that empire. Hard as it may be to define precisely this political anomaly, the broad facts must not be disguised. We all know and feel that England is the mistress, India the subject land.

- That sovereignty must reside somewhere is a first principle in the philosophy of politics. To detect the sovereign power is sometimes difficult in practice, though it can never be impossible. According to the English



constitution, Parliament is the real sovereign; the House of Commons is, in the last resource, supreme in Parliament; and the House of Commons represents—and indeed is—the people of England. Therefore, throughout the entire empire, the people of England (or, more strictly, the people of the United Kingdom) can alone be termed sovereign. All the remaining members of the empire are in some sort dependencies, though the degree of dependence may vary from the case of Canada to the case of a Crown colony.

In its relation to England India differs from any Crown colony only in respect of size. But this difference of size is in truth tantamount to a difference of kind. To administer an empire is not the same thing as to command a fortress. And India, with its one and a half millions of square miles and its two hundred and sixty millions of inhabitants, must always be regarded as an empire in itself. Yet, with the doubtful exception of China, no emperor that the world has ever seen had so many subjects as are now ruled by the democracy of England.

If, then, it is desirable that the English citizen should be taught those rights and duties which appeal everywhere and every day to his own immediate interests, it becomes absolutely necessary that he should learn something of his responsibilities towards an empire so immense and so remote. The time is long past when India was deliberately treated as a source of profit to individual Englishmen. That theory, or at least that practice, could not survive the burning denunciation of Burke. That we hold India for the good of the Indians is no longer an empty phrase of national self-satisfaction.

But ignorant good-will may produce as much mischief as calculated selfishness. "Let us educate our rulers" should be the cry of every Indian who desires to promote the practical interests of his countrymen. An attempt at such a task is the object of these pages; in which it is proposed to say something—first, of the country, its people, and history; second, of the system of administration under its several aspects; and third, of the results of British rule in India, and the probable future of the country.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE COUNTRY, ITS PEOPLE, AND HISTORY.

To give an adequate account of the physical aspects of India, of its various races, and of its historical vicissitudes, would of course be far beyond our limits. Yet a sketch must be attempted, for without some knowledge of these it is impossible for Englishmen to realise the nature of the great problem with which they have to deal. If we cannot be precise, we must at least try to form a general picture of a world that is both vast and strange.

On the map India seems to form a country marked out by nature for union and for greatness. Corresponding to Italy in the Mediterranean, it is a peninsula with a long double seaboard and a lofty landward barrier. Here, it may be thought, a nation might grow up safe from external attack, and at the same time enriched by foreign commerce. India has, it is true, been from immemorial the great trading country of the East. But its people have never been united, either in blood or in subjection to a common ruler; and it has always been exposed to invasion from without. Its size is too great for union, and its physical configuration has helped to cause diversity. The first thing that Englishmen need

to learn about India is that it is not one country, nor ever has been. Indeed, there is no common name for the entire peninsula to be found in any of the vernaculars. Sanskrit scholars may talk about Aryāvarta; but, as we shall presently have to show, no mistake is more mischievous than to confound the modern Indians with the Aryans of philology. Hindūstan, the familiar term of our geography books, is a Persian word, which is properly restricted to the upper plain of the Ganges. It is we who have given India one name and one government.

Physically, India is split up into several great divisions. Along the north, and on the corner frontiers, run ridge behind ridge of mountains, including the highest peaks in the world. The tribes that inhabit the valleys amid these mountains are, for the most part, independent and brave. They have repeatedly invaded India, but they do not strictly form part of the Indian people. The true India—the seat of its densest population and of its natural wealth—consists of the long level plain that stretches south from the mountain barrier, and is watered by the twin river systems of the Ganges and the Indus. Of this true India, Delhi may be regarded as the historic centre. Here was the first settlement of the half-mythical Aryans. Here Alexander stayed his march. Here Gautama Buddha lived and taught and died. Here successive dynasties of conquering Muhammadans fixed their capitals. Here were the battlefields of Lord Lake, of the Sikh wars, and of the Mutiny. At Delhi, Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India. Whoever holds the great plain from Peshawar to Calcutta is the master of the entire peninsula. South-

world of this plain rises a confused tableland—the Deccan or “South”—which may be said to extend from the very bank of the Ganges down to the farthest point of Cape Comorin. On the whole, this tableland is hilly, interspersed with jungle, and imperfectly watered. Its inhabitants belong to various races, all of which probably preceded the Aryan invasion. Though by far the largest portion of the peninsula, it has played but little part in history, and has generally been divided into independent and hostile kingdoms. On each side it is fringed along the coast by a fertile lowland tract, from which it draws a tribute of rice and salt, and through which it keeps up a communication by sea with the outer world.

The plain of the Ganges to the north, and the tableland of the Deccan to the south, are the two great divisions of India which it is important to recollect as affecting the people and the history; but even these divisions are by no means uniform within themselves. The northern plain, as we have defined it, extends from the sandy desert of Sinde to the alluvial swamps of Lower Bengal. As in most tropical countries, the amount and character of the water-supply have determined the condition of the inhabitants. Throughout the whole basin of the Indus rain falls scantily, and agriculture absolutely depends upon irrigation from the rivers. But the climate is comparatively healthy, and the people belong to the finest races in the East. Wheat is the staple crop, and Muhammadanism the prevailing religion. Making an exception of the excessive heat and dryness of the atmosphere, Englishmen probably feel themselves more at home in the Punjab than in any other part of India.

Eastward of the Punjab come the North-Western Provinces and Oudh. The rainfall is less scanty, the population more dense, the proportion of Hindus greater. Wheat is largely cultivated, but so also are rice, millets, and other crops not for food. Here are the great historic cities from Delhi to Benares, all (with the exception of Lucknow) either on the Ganges or on its great tributary the Jumna. Irrigation has been introduced by English engineers to assist a dubious rainfall; and some of the finest crops in the world are raised, leaving a considerable surplus for export. The population is fairly homogeneous, despite a long Musalman domination; and here, if anywhere, is to be found the genuine Aryan, as he becomes under a burning sun. Eastward, again, lies Bengal proper, where the rainfall increases, the river channels become larger and more numerous, until the actual delta is reached. This is the garden of India, if estimated by the abundance and variety of the crops. Rice is the great staple. The climate is unpleasant and unhealthy; natives suffer most in the cold season, Europeans in the rainy season. The mass of the population is of a dark aboriginal stock, and the proportion of Hindus to Muhammadans varies in a perplexing way. But it is important to observe that the Hindus and Muhammadans are one and the same race. In Bengal even more than in other parts of India it would be a gross error to imagine that Hindus must be the original Aryans, and Musalmans the descendants of foreign invaders.

The south of the peninsula does not need to be described in so much detail, though its several portions differ much from each other. On the whole, it is insuffi-

ciently watered; the rivers are useful, neither for agriculture nor for commerce; the rainfall is comparatively slight, and ever liable to fail. Grand schemes of artificial irrigation are nowhere possible. Various sorts of millet and similar minute grains are everywhere the staple crop. In certain favoured tracts cotton is largely grown; but the remaining great exports of India—rice, wheat, oil-seeds, jute, indigo, and tea—ll come from the more favoured north.

To the peninsula of India recent conquest has added the outlying province of Burmah, which is Indian neither in history nor in race. That part of Burmah which is under British rule comprises only a long strip between the mountains and the sea, together with the lower valley of the Irrawadi. Independent Burmah stretches behind to the frontiers of China. The Burmese are a singularly attractive people, professing the mild tenets of Buddhism. Their country is the most prolific rice-field in the world, and no other portion of the British empire has made such rapid strides in material prosperity during the past thirty years.

Such is a brief outline of the physical aspects of India. But the people are by no means divided strictly according to the divisions indicated. Just as India is really not one country but many, so its many countries do not form distinct nationalities. From an ethnological point of view the people of India are singularly mixed, and the modern science of philology has done something to increase the confusion. The inventors of the word "Aryan" have much to answer for. It is true that a great majority of the population, including nearly all those that live in the northern half, speak cognate

languages, all alike ultimately derived from Sanskrit, and written in the Nagari character. Similarly the inhabitants of the south speak cognate languages to which the common term of "Dravidian" has been applied, and which have a separate writing of their own. But it cannot be too strongly insisted that language is no sure test of race. To conclude that all the Sanskrit-speaking peoples belong to the "Aryan stock" would be as absurd as to suppose that Italians, Frenchmen, and Spaniards are alike descended from the ancient Romans.

The ethnology of India has never yet been adequately treated. The materials are too vast and too complicated. The term "aborigines" has no precise meaning in science but we are justified in supposing that the earliest known inhabitants are still represented by the hill tribes to be found in the centre of the peninsula. These hill tribes differ much from one another in physique, in language, and in manners. Some of them, from their peculiarities, have attracted an undue share of attention; others, under our very eyes, are rapidly becoming merged in the ordinary Hindu population. A distinction is often made between those of them that use dialects of a Dravidian type and others whose languages are vaguely classed as "Kolarian;" but it may be doubted whether this classification is based upon anything fundamental. Generally speaking they may be said to belong to a negrito type. They are all born hunters and foresters, but most of them also practise agriculture by the primitive method of burning down each year a fresh patch of jungle. They live in independent communities, which in their own way are as systematically organised as a Hindu village. Sometimes they are subject to Hindu Rajas;



but, with the doubtful exception of the Gonds, they seem never to have developed a political state. They are savages, but by no means without the savage virtues. Against Hindu oppression they have now and again burst forth with unbridled ferocity, but English officers have often proved them to be loyal to the death. It is among them that Christianity makes most of its converts. Their total number may be estimated at from 20 to 30 millions.

These wild tribes, who still hold their own in the hills and forests of the interior, are the unconquered remnants of a people that once covered the country. Their brethren in the plains were not exterminated, but only subdued. They now form the Sudras, or lower castes, of the Hindu social system, large numbers of whom have been in certain tracts converted to Islam. The great bulk of the inhabitants of Lower Bengal certainly belong to this semi-Hinduised stock; so probably do those of Bombay; so also with Madras, if we are justified in disregarding altogether the indications of language. These are the people who supply the agricultural, artisan, and labouring population everywhere but in the north-west. They form the most industrious peasantry in the world, and the most docile subjects. It was, however, from among them Clive raised his sepoys, and from among them have come robber clans and gangs of professional assassins. The total number of the low castes—Hindu and Muhammadan—probably amounts to 200 millions, or four-fifths of the total population.

The Aryan element proper is very difficult of estimation. It is probably to be traced, more or less diluted,

in the bulk of the class just mentioned, at least in those of them that inhabit the north. It has certainly given them their language and their civilisation. But, so far as purity of blood is concerned, the only genuine Aryans now to be found in India are the sacerdotal caste of Brahmans. Their light colour, their graceful physique, their intellectual superiority, alike betray the immigrant and conqueror from the north. If caste has done nothing else, it has at least preserved one breed of men pure for thirty centuries, despite the influence of soil, climate, and successive waves of conquest. The Brahmans share with the Jews the right to be called the aristocracy of the world. They live under almost identical conditions in every district of India, from the extreme north to the extreme south; but they gather thickest round the holy city of Benares. Their total number slightly exceeds 10 millions.

The Rajputs claim, equally with the Brahmans, to belong to the "twice born," and are commonly identified with the Kshatriya or warrior caste of Manu's system. But Manu's fourfold system of caste is, in truth, a mere artificial classification of comparatively late date, invented to support priestly and regal pretensions. Of the real origin of the so-called Rajputs, or "children of the king," we know nothing, except that they have always been the dominant race. Modern research has rendered it probable that they are a Scythic tribe, who entered India from the north-west long after the first Aryan invasion. It is certain they are a very mixed people, bound together only by a claim to royal blood. Even in our day several tribes of manifestly aboriginal descent have asserted their right to the name; and still

more frequently do we find mixed castes that are known to be Rajput on one side only. Very few Rajput families are to be found throughout the entire south. In the Punjab many of them have accepted Islam. Numerically, they muster strongest in the North-West Provinces and Oudh, where their clannish sympathies are very conspicuous. In the collection of native states called after their name they form only the ruling race, under chiefs who trace their descent from the sun and the moon; the bulk of the population there are aborigines. The Rajputs number altogether about 6 millions.

To complete our ethnical sketch of the people of India it is necessary to notice briefly two or three more elements. The numerous Dravidian races of the south, and the warlike Mahratta stock in the mountains behind Bombay, may be passed over in a sentence. Though they present very distinct types of humanity, of their origin we know absolutely nothing; and we must be content to call them Hinduised aborigines. Even the higher classes among them never claim to be Rajputs. But two stocks not before alluded to have each exercised some influence on India within historical times. These are Musalman invaders from the north-west, and Indo-Chinese swarms from the north-east. The Muhamadan conquerors were themselves of many races — Arabian, Afghan, Mongol, Persian, Biloch, and even Abyssinian. But most of these have become either absorbed or isolated in the indigenous population. The Afghans alone, who are generally known in India as Pathans, seem to have been able to preserve their nationality to some extent. They are most numerous, of course, along the frontier of independent Afghanistan;

but they have also given one of their clan names to Rohilkhand. Another interesting class of Muhammadans are the traders of mixed Arab origin, who are settled on the western coast from Sind to Cape Comorin, under the names of Memons, Borahs, Khojahs, Moplas, and Labbays. The total number of Musalmāns in India is about 50 millions, or one-third of the estimated population of the aggregate Musalmān world. But the great majority of them are converts from Hinduism, and scarcely to be distinguished from their Hindu fellow-subjects. On the whole, they live quietly side by side, engaged in the same pursuits; but religious fanaticism may at any time set the two religions by the ears.

The Indo-Chinese stock is not strongly represented in India, from which it has been kept out by stronger races. The Himalayas are the limit of the Indo-Chinese, and the Himalayas form no part of India proper. The Gurkhalis of Nepal, who have been enlisted into our native regiments, belong to this stock, as shown by their low stature and Mongolian features. The north-eastern province of Assam is mainly Indo-Chinese; and around it on every side but one rise mountains inhabited by wilder tribes of the same race. It is probable, also, that the semi-Hinduised population of Eastern Bengal is largely modified by Indo-Chinese admixture.

The Parsees form a small but prosperous and enlightened community in the city of Bombay. A few Jewish colonies of very old date dwell on the southern coast. Armenian and Greek merchants are now less influential in Bengal than they were during the last century. The only European race that has perceptibly affected the population is the Portuguese. Along the western

coast, from Goá to Bombay, and in two settlements in Bengal near Dacca and Chittagong, Portuguese half-castes are still to be found, distinguishable from the natives only by their religion and their surnames.

The total number of Christians in India amounts to about a million and a half. Of these the vast majority—say thirteen-fifteenths—are Roman Catholics, being the product either of the great Jesuit missions, or of Portuguese domination in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The native Christians, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, are mainly confined to the extreme south. The Madras Presidency has about 600,000; and the two Madras Principalities of Travancore and Cochin have as many more, being one-fifth of their entire population. These states are also the headquarters of the Church of the Syrian rite, which professes to trace its origin to the preaching of St. Thomas the Apostle. Protestant missions have recently been working with success among the hill tribes of Western Bengal, Burmah, and Assam.

While India thus varies greatly in climate and soil, in the race, language, and religion of its inhabitants, a general uniformity prevails in the life of the people everywhere. Hindu, Muhammadan, and native Christian live in much the same houses, dress in much the same way, and eat much the same food. Agriculture is the prevailing occupation of all to an extent scarcely intelligible to modern Englishmen. Even those who do not themselves drive the plough, such as Brahmans and handicraftsmen, are directly dependent upon the annual produce of the village fields. Indeed, it seems probable that British rule has tended in some measure to intensify this predomi-

nance of agriculture. The courts of native chiefs are no longer the busy centres of a varied urban life, and local manufactures have dwindled under competition from England. But though the village life is monotonous, it is regulated by a definite organisation, possessing the permanence of a prehistoric type. This village community is usually described as a mark of Aryan civilisation. But, as a matter of fact, it is found by no means most strongly developed where the higher castes predominate, and it can be distinctly traced even among the hill tribes. Most probably it ought to be regarded as a form of society through which all mankind passes when in the agricultural stage. Not only in their village communities, but also in their trade guilds and hereditary castes, the Indians have established a simple yet adequate framework for their daily needs. Their wants are not many, but, on the whole, they are fairly well met. If they lack the stimulus to exertion that impels an Englishman to compass the globe, they lack also the vices of a complex civilisation. Those who know them best have always spoken most warmly of their patience, their kind-heartedness, and their charity. Working men and women are much the same all the world over.

The history of India has often been told ;<sup>1</sup> and here a very brief outline must suffice. Sanskrit scholars inform us that we ought to begin with the conquest of the dark-skinned and snub-nosed aborigines by the fair Aryans from the north. But of such a conquest history proper has nothing to say. Unlike the Egyptians and

<sup>1</sup> The most recent authorities, within a moderate compass, are Mr. J. Talboys Wheeler's *Short History of India* (1880) and Dr. W. W. Hunter's *Brief History of the Indian People* (1882).

Babylonians, the prehistoric Indians have left us no written records. The oldest inscriptions in India—those of the Buddhist emperor, Asoka—date only from the third century B.C. ; but references in Greek writers carry us back two hundred years earlier. Nowhere do we find any evidence for a distribution of the people different to that which prevails now. All the Greek authorities bear witness to the dense populousness of India, its material prosperity, and the virtues of its inhabitants. Alexander the Great invaded India in 327 B.C., at the time when Buddhism was establishing itself as the dominant religion. But it is very difficult to connect the evidence given by Greek historians with the facts as they appear in Indian sources. The Greeks say nothing about Buddha ; the Indians have preserved no recollections of Alexander (except through Persian legends). The connection of Greece with India merely serves to fix the reign of Chandragupta (Sandracottus), King of Pataliputra (Patna), and grandfather of Asoka. Megasthenes was sent as ambassador to the court of Chandragupta in 306 B.C. This is the only certain date in early Indian chronology. Authentic history does not begin again until the first Muhammadan invasion in the seventh century A.D.

What took place in India between the era of Asoka and the invasion of Mahmud of Ghazni is almost as entirely mythical as what took place before the invasion of Alexander. All we are justified in stating is that, within four centuries after the death of Gautama Buddha (*circ.* 540 B.C.), his teaching had converted the whole of India ; and that, before the Muhammadans came upon the scene, it had again disappeared. The whole epoch

of Buddhism in its native country is legendary. Our only sure witnesses are the inscriptions of Asoka, a few sculptures and ruined temples, and the itineraries of some Chinese pilgrims. But as Buddhism disappeared from India it found a home in Ceylon, Nepal, and Burmah; it extended to China, and still retains more followers than any other single religion. The Indians have never been an aggressive race; but through Buddhism, the ideal representative of their highest morality, they have profoundly influenced the whole eastern world.

Local tradition, and the scanty evidence of coins and inscriptions on stone and copper, agree in stating that India was divided among a number of minor kingdoms during the first ten centuries of our era. Some of these were Buddhist, others Brahmanical, and others again Jain—a religion which is supposed to be a modified form of Buddhism, and still counts a few wealthy adherents. The people had not united against Alexander; they did not unite against the Muhammadans. The first Musalman attack upon India occurred in the seventh century, within a hundred years after the death of the Prophet. But this invasion was confined to the outlying province of Sind, and had no permanent effects. It was Mahmud of Ghazni, the greatest warrior of his time, who showed the way to the fierce mountaineers of the north-west frontier to reap the harvest of the Indian plains. Mahmud is said to have led his armies into India no less than seventeen times, ravaging the country as far as Kanauj, Gwalior, and Somnauth. He never settled in the plains, but died at his own capital in 1030. The work of conquest was taken up by a rival Afghan dynasty that took its name from the rock fortress of Ghor.



Muhammad of Ghor defeated the allied Rajput kings again and again, and extended his dominions as far east as Bengal. His general and successor, Kutab-ud-din, established himself in 1206 as an independent sovereign at Delhi, the ancient Hindu capital. From that date the Muhammadan empire in India may be said to begin. The chivalrous Rajputs fought long and well; and, when defeated, many of them followed their ancient kings into the desert now called Rajputana. The Muhammadans had it all their own way throughout the valleys of the Ganges and the Indus, but their conquest of the south was extremely slow and never sure. As early as 1303 a horde of Muhammadan horsemen rode on a raid southward, which is said to have reached Cape Comorin; but they withdrew as quickly as they had come. The Musalmans were no more united than the Hindus. The ruler of Delhi was always regarded in some sort as a suzerain, but he rarely combined power with prestige. Independent kingdoms sprang up in Bengal, Malwa, Guzerat, and Jaunpur; and there were at one time no less than five dynasties in the Deccan, who were habitually at war with one another. The final downfall of the Hindu nationality dates from the battle of Talikot (1565), when the allied sultans of the Deccan overthrew the last Raja of Vijayanagar. But though there was no longer any Hindu power in the south that could pretend to be a state, the people were saved from invasion by their remoteness. Numerous petty chieftains set up for themselves, some of whom have been fortunate enough to retain a measure of independence to this day.

Common opinion is right in regarding the Mongol,

Mogul, or Mughal dynasty as the only real emperors of India before the English. The first of the line was Baber, himself sixth in descent from Timur (Tamerlane), who captured Delhi from a degenerate Afghan king in 1526. Baber's son, Humayun, was unfortunate, but Humayun's son was Akbar the Great, the true founder of the Mughal empire. Akbar reigned from 1556 to 1605, being nearly contemporary with our own Elizabeth. Whether we regard him in peace or war, history can show few greater names. Succeeding his father at the age of fourteen, he had first to reconquer the Punjab. By a series of campaigns, mostly conducted by himself in person, he annexed Rajputana, Guzerat, Bengal, Sind, Afghanistan, and Kashmir to the Mughal crown. These wide dominions were all subjected to a military organisation, and strictly administered from the central authority. Through the agency of his Hindu minister, Todar Mall, Akbar devised the system of land settlement which remains to the present day. His virtues were no less remarkable than his genius for government. No Muhammadan has ever been so tolerant of other faiths, perhaps so indifferent to his own. He admitted Hindus to high commands in the army; he took to wife a princess of Rajputana; he invited Jesuit missionaries to dispute at his court with Musalman *mullas*.

Under Aurangzeb, the third in descent from Akbar, the Mughal empire attained its widest limits. He was the first who conquered the Deccan, and whose suzerainty was recognised by the chiefs of the extreme south. On Aurangzeb's death in 1707 the empire rapidly fell to pieces, though its prestige remained to our own day. Each governor of a province set up as an independent

prints. The Hindu nationality, which had been stung to life after several centuries of subjection by the bigotry of Aurangzeb, found a champion in the indomitable Mahratta, Sivaji (1627-1680). When the English appeared on the political stage the Musalman powers were feeble and divided; the Mahratta confederacy was on the point of overrunning the whole country.

Vasco da Gama landed at Calicut in 1498, and for a full century the Portuguese enjoyed a monopoly of intercourse with the East. The Portuguese, however, were crusaders rather than administrators, pirates rather than merchants. They have left a name for bravery, and also for cruelty; but the political results of their supremacy are now represented only by the petty settlement of Goa. The Dutch were the second European nation to reach the eastern seas. Their object was commerce, and their goal was the Spice Islands, where they freed themselves from English competition by the massacre of Amboyna (1623). The "Merchants of London trading to the Indies" were incorporated by royal charter on the last day of the year 1600, with the deliberate aim of breaking the trading monopoly of the Dutch. Driven back by the Dutch from the farther east, they founded their first settlement on the mainland of India in 1639. This was Fort St. George, now Madras. They obtained permission to fortify their factory from a local Hindu chief, who boasted to be the heir of the Raja of Vijayanagar; and for many years later they paid a tribute to the Muhammadan viceroy. The island of Bombay was ceded to Charles II. as part of the dowry of his Portuguese queen in 1661; Fort William, or Calcutta, was built in 1686.

The territorial power of the English arose from their

rivalry with the French, as an episode in the war of the Austrian Succession. Dupleix, Governor of Pondicherry, was the first to see that the decay of Mughal authority afforded the opportunity to any European adventurer to establish an empire under its shadow. But his ingenious schemes were shattered by the superior vigour of Clive, who saved the south from a French supremacy before he won Bengal for the English by the battle of Plassey (1757). Clive, following the example of Dupleix, adopted the plan of governing through the existing Mahammadan rulers; and for this he obtained a written authority from the Great Mughal (1765). A European system was introduced by Warren Hastings (1772-1785), the first governor-general of all India, whose genius for government was felt in every department. Lord Cornwallis (1786-1793) reorganised the administration, and gave to Bengal the Permanent Settlement. The Marquis of Wellesley (1798-1805) crushed Tipper, and by a system of subsidiary alliances with the native powers made the English dominant throughout the peninsula. Lord William Bentinck (1828-1835) has the credit of inaugurating those principles of humanity which are now recognised to be the sole justification of our occupation of India. The Marquis of Dalhousie (1848-1856) applied the same principles in a different way. In his eyes English rule was so good and native rule so bad, that no opportunity ought to be lost of extending the former at the expense of the latter. After Dalhousie came the Mutiny (May 1857 to April 1859), which opens a new epoch in Indian history. The East India Company perished in the general cataclysm. The government was transferred by Act of Parliament to the Crown (1858), and henceforth a more

direct responsibility rests upon Englishmen at home. The proclamation of the Queen as Empress of India (*Kaisar-i-Hind*), on January 1, 1877, emphasises the different position which she holds towards her English and her Indian subjects.

## CHAPTER III.

### THE POLITICAL DIVISIONS OF INDIA.

THE empire of England over India was won by the sword, and it rests to this day upon no other title. The only ratification it has received is that of its continuance. No theory of original contract or of the rights of man has here any place. Political philosophy must accept the facts, which of necessity imply a despotic form of government. But in the case of India despotism is not only tempered by benevolence, but also complicated by being exercised through a variety of means. India was not conquered in a single battle, nor annexed by a single treaty. In some sense the Indians were accustomed to consider the Company, as they now consider the Queen, to be the heir of the Great Moghal, and therefore universal suzerain by right of succession. But it is easy to exaggerate the force of this claim, which is itself a mere restatement of the fact of conquest.

Politically, India is divided into two parts, commonly known as British territory and the native states. The first portion alone is ruled directly by English officials, and its inhabitants alone are subjects of the Queen. The native states are sometimes called feudatory—a

convenient term to express their vague relation to the British crown. To define that relation precisely would be impossible. It has arisen at different times and by different methods; it varies from semi-independence to complete subjection. Some chiefs are the representatives of those whom we found on our first arrival in the country & others owe their existence to our creation. Some are parties to treaties entered into as between equal powers; others have consented to receive patents from their suzerain recording their limited rights; with others, again, there are no written engagements at all. Some have fought with us and come out of the struggle without dishonour. Some pay tribute; others pay none. Their extent and power vary as greatly as their political status. The Nizam of Haidarabad governs a kingdom of 80,000 square miles and 10,000,000 inhabitants. Some of the petty chieftains of Kathiawar exercise authority over only a few acres.

It is, however, necessary to draw a line sharply circumscribing the native states, as a class, from British territory. Every native chief possesses a certain measure of local authority, which is not derivative but inherent. English control, when and as exercised, is not so much of an administrative as of a diplomatic nature. In Anglo-Indian terminology this shade of meaning is expressed by the word "political." Dealings with a native state are all "political," even though they be conducted by the ordinary civil official. And the humblest chief cherishes this shadow of independence as a valuable right.

The peninsula of Kathiawar, to which allusion has been made above, alone has nearly 200 separate chiefships.

The total number in all India must be more than a thousand. But for the present purpose it will be sufficient to indicate the general character of the relation that exists between the British power and the few great principalities, which may be taken to number about 20 or 30. The treaties with these vary, and therefore some of the details; but the necessities of the case, and the traditions of the foreign office, have tended to develop a common political system of recognised validity.

In the first place, all the native chiefs have lost the right of making war or peace, and of sending ambassadors to one another or to external states. This supreme mark of independence is vested solely in the British power, which guarantees peace throughout the peninsula. Secondly, and as ancillary to this, all the native chiefs (with but a single exception) are prohibited from maintaining a military force above a certain specified limit; and no European is allowed to reside in their territory without permission. Thirdly, a certain measure of good government is demanded (or, rather, gross misgovernment is prevented) under the penalty of temporary or permanent dethronement. As examples of this principle may be taken the regulations against the burning of widows and the destruction of female children; and, in a more striking form, the occupation of Mysore in 1830, and the more recent deposition of the Gaekwar of Baroda in 1875. But the restoration of Mysore to its hereditary Raja in 1881, and the recognition of a new Gaekwar in the room of his predecessor, have shown to the native chiefs that misrule will not be turned into a pretext for annexation. Lastly, the Crown is in India, as in England, the fountain of honour. The chiefs take rank



among themselves according to the number of guns they receive in the salute that welcomes them to state ceremonials. They are proud to be enrolled in the Order of the Star of India, and two of their number have been gazetted honorary generals in the British army. Subject to these reservations, the native chiefs of the first rank possess most of the prerogatives of sovereignty. They have the power of legislation, of passing capital sentences, of enlisting soldiers, of coining money, of levying tax. They are styled Royal Highnesses, and are amenable to no ordinary English tribunal. Their position is anomalous, and its restraints may occasionally gall their pride. But, on the whole, no class of the community has gained more from British intervention; none is more conspicuously loyal.

As holds true of the entire system of Indian administration, there is no uniformity in the methods by which diplomatic or "political" relations are conducted between the British power and the native states. Most of the larger states are in direct connection with the supreme government; others are dependent upon the governors of the provinces within which they are situated; others, again, are under the charge of the subordinate official who administers the adjoining, or encompassing, British district. The degree of interference in the internal administration also varies. But, as a general proposition, and excepting the quite insignificant states, it may be stated that the government is carried on not only in the name but also by the initiative of the native chief. At all the large capitals, and at certain centres round which minor states are grouped, a British officer is stationed under the style of Resident or Agent. Through him all

diplomatic affairs are conducted. He is at once an ambassador and a controller. His duty is to represent the majesty of the suzerain power, to keep a watchful eye upon abuses, and to encourage reforms. But he does not act as minister, or even as councillor. His advice need not be asked. He has no power to enforce it. No position in India requires more delicate management than his. From the prosperity of the state he can gain little credit; for its misgovernment he must always be partly responsible.

The remainder of these pages will be concerned with British India. But, in order to complete our survey of the country, it is necessary to mention in this place that both the Portuguese and the French still exercise territorial sovereignty there. With the Portuguese we have never been at war; and their three possessions of Goa, Daman, and Diu are older than British rule. All three are on the western coast, and their total population is only 400,000 souls. The French possessions are still smaller, consisting mainly of old trading factories with the fields adjoining. They have all been at one time captured by the English, but were restored in 1815. The French capital is Pondicherry, and the total number of French subjects less than 300,000. These Portuguese and French possessions are, of course, absolutely independent of British authority, as Gibraltar is independent of Spain. That disputes about jurisdiction and custom duties should be now unknown is creditable to all concerned. Besides the Portuguese and the French, no other power, European or native, calls itself independent of England between the Himalaya and the sea.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT.

THE administration of British India is the most gigantic task that a nation has ever attempted. The Roman Empire was larger in area, the Chinese empire may possibly be larger in population; but in neither case do we find a ruling race composed of foreigners whose home is beyond the sea. Spain tried to found a similar empire in America, but with no success. Our Indian empire is unique not only in its grandeur, but also in its objects. Granting an irresistible superiority in arms, such as ours has proved, and it might not be difficult to conceive a military despotism exercised over a country even as large as India. To draw a tribute from conquered provinces would be no new event. But for a small band of alien rulers to organise a government on disinterested principles has no parallel in history. Criticism may find many points of detail to censure in that government, but it is impossible not to admire its general policy, and the devotedness of those who conduct it.

For the English administration of India, which began in a very simple way, has developed into a machine of

excessive complexity. To examine such a machine must always be interesting—specially so when we consider that it is the first great experiment of introducing western ideas into the East, of trying to raise a people by external means to a higher stage of civilisation. Difficulties surround on all sides. What looks the easiest plan would often be the most hazardous. All the ordinary landmarks are useless. We are attempting an absolutely novel undertaking, with no precedents to guide us, no public opinion to warn or encourage. Who shall say as yet that we are not building upon the sand? It may be that we are slowly changing the unchangeable East, and creating a new type of human society. It may be that all we are doing will one day be swept away by some catastrophe it would be idle to anticipate, and India revert again to what she has been through countless centuries.

The very word “administration” requires to be understood differently in England and in India. Here it means properly the Queen’s government, the ministers who manage affairs of state. If the modern tendency be to favour the interference of the state in matters that are only quasi-public, still that interference takes the form of supervision, not of direct action. In India “administration” means that officials themselves conduct the whole work of public life—everything, in short, that is not purely domestic. The word “citizen” there has no meaning. Public duties have no existence. Individuals are a mere herd of units, under the charge of an executive officer.

This was not always the case. When the responsibility of government was first undertaken by the English

about a hundred years ago, they found a simple state of society and a simple system of administration. The Hindu village, with its cultivators, artisans, and staff of petty officials, was the unit both of agriculture and of social life. Apart from this, and above this, was the Muhammadan organisation of government, with two duties and two duties only—the collection of the revenue and the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. These elementary functions were all that was expected of the state; any other public work, such as the making of a road or the digging of a tank, was a matter of supererogation, as likely to be performed by a wealthy merchant as by a governor. The English, at first, were far from wishing to change this simple order of things. Clive, indeed, appears to have deliberately desired its continuance. But as soon as it became necessary to transfer the collection of revenue and the administration of justice to European officials, the old simplicity was doomed. Many awkward attempts were made to leave the people to themselves as much as possible—of which the Permanent Settlement in Bengal is one; but the inevitable course of circumstances pressed in the other direction. The doctrine of *laissez faire* was proved to be impracticable. The whole internal history of India during the present century consists of a series of advances towards a benevolent despotism.

The principal cause at work has been the sense of responsibility weighing upon the English administrators. This operated by contrasting the low state of Indian civilisation with an ideal, drawn not so much from actual English experience as from a Utopia. The most active reformers in India have always been the chief advocates

of increased state interference. Munro in Madras, Thomason in the North-West Provinces, John Lawrence in the Punjab, and the two Stracheys throughout the entire peninsula—each aimed at making the lot of the people happier by increasing the duties of government. Thus it has gradually come about that the machinery of administration has become almost too complicated to be understood, and almost too heavy to be borne. Theories based upon the standards of Western civilisation have been adopted for an Oriental country before the inhabitants have acquired any desire for them. The official is well-nigh overwhelmed with his duties, and can expect little sympathy in his performance of them.

The unit of administration in India is the District, which corresponds to the English shire or the French department. But in proportion as administration means more in India than in Europe, so is the District a more important matter than its counterparts. If it were possible to explain adequately all that is implied in a District and a District officer, the secret of Indian government would be revealed. In the first place, the District is altogether a creation of British rule. It had no predecessor in native times. Though varying greatly in area and population, the District is always the charge of a single official, who represents all the manifold aspects of the executive power. The judicial authority is usually in other hands. This executive officer may be called either Collector or Deputy-Commissioner; he may be directly responsible to the Governor of his province or to an intermediate Commissioner; he may have many subordinates under him, or few—yet he stands forth as the typical representative of British government.

As indicated by his name, the functions of the Collector are primarily fiscal, or at least fiscal in their origin. His official title preserves the tradition of that early period when the principal duty of government, as inherited from our Muhammaḍan predecessors, was to assess and collect revenue. The operations of land settlement (to be described subsequently) have rendered the process of collecting the revenue one of the lightest of a Collector's duties; but all the revenue of his District, whether derived from land or from other sources, still passes through his hands. The Collector, therefore, must know the land system of his particular province—itsself the labour of a lifetime; and he must also be something of an accountant. But we have not yet given our Collector his full official title, which is that of Collector-Magistrate. As Magistrate, again, his functions are dual. On the one hand, he represents the executive power under its manifold aspects, most nearly resembling the French *préfet*. On the other, he performs judicial duties as a court of first instance, with ultimate authority in minor cases, and also conducts preliminary examinations for graver offences. In his capacity of Collector he exercises a third form of jurisdiction in revenue matters. Subordinate to him are Deputy-Collectors and Assistant-Magistrates, whose number varies according to the size of the District. These form the lower grades in the administrative hierarchy. They relieve the Collector of large portions of his work, but they cannot share his responsibility.

The whole tendency of constitutional progress in England has been to impose limitations upon the power of the executive. The whole tendency of administrative

development in India has been to increase the authority of the executive. In both cases the beginnings of counter-tendencies may be traced, but the general course has not yet been arrested. From his first creation the Indian Collector was a petty despot, representing the measure of benevolence and of activity which his European education might have inspired. In early days he remained for long years in his District, and the central government was far away. Everything depended upon his own initiative. The necessary work of his fiscal and magisterial offices was not excessive; any personal influence that he might exercise was voluntary. It is to the credit of the service that so many Collectors interpreted their functions liberally, and left their Districts better than they found them. But with a new consciousness of the responsibilities of government which has arisen in India, the position of the Collector has entirely changed. He is no longer an autonomous despot, but a wheel in a machinery of despotism. What was once left to the chance of individual character is now demanded as an official duty. It is expected of him to supply the entire organisation of political life which a dozen different bodies scarcely supply in England. Administrative burdens have been accumulated upon him until all personal initiative has been stunted. The Collector promises to become a mere organ for transmitting the orders of his superiors, and for registering the condition of his District. Whatever Government wants done the Collector has to provide the means of doing; whatever Government wants to know the Collector has to procure the information. Under the one aspect he directs the local machinery of administration, under the other he is the head



of a department of clerks. He is responsible (through the intervention of subordinate departments) for the police, for the gaols, for the schools, for the roads, for the municipalities, and for all the other manifold requirements of Western civilisation. He is likewise expected to know everything about the condition of his District—its castes, its crops, its tenures, its manufactures, its trade, its forests, its wild animals; on any of these he may be called upon at short notice to compile an elaborate report. There never probably was an office with such heavy responsibilities and such multifarious duties as that of an Indian Collector.

At the other end of the administrative hierarchy is the Provincial Governor, surrounded by his secretariat. The initiative which the District Officers have lost has passed in great measure to the central authority. If we have nothing in England like the Collector, still less have we anything like the Governor. He is a sort of civil commander-in-chief, and the secretariat is his headquarters staff. From the Governor to the Deputy-Collector the bond of administrative discipline is both active and strict; above the Governor no regular authority is exercised. The Province is the largest unit in the empire, as the District is the smallest unit. One code of criminal law and uniform codes of civil and criminal procedure prevail throughout the empire; but the system of executive administration varies with every Province. The several Provinces sometimes correspond with differences of race, history, and natural boundaries; they always represent stages in British conquest. Hence has arisen the variety in the systems of administration, which is most visible in the forms of land tenure.

*The Governor is practically an autocrat, though in some cases assisted by a Council, and always theoretically subject to the supremacy of the Viceroy. His personality gives a character to the entire administration, and can stimulate or retard progress. His office is the highest to which a member of the Indian service can aspire. Its duties are ample for the most soaring ambition. For the Governor is now what the Collector formerly was, in a more conspicuous station and with a wider field. If no great reforms are in his power, it is always open to him to achieve minor administrative changes that must affect the happiness of millions.*

The growth of the secretariat is at once the measure and the result of the degree to which the administration has become centralised. The secretaries form the agency by which the complicated machine is supervised. They are the eyes and hands of the Governor. Through them he issues his orders to the District Officers; to them come back the multifarious reports which the District Officers are ever compiling. They enjoy the stimulating life of a capital, but are not in direct contact with the people, and do not perform the actual work of governing.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION.

It has been thought advisable to give a sketch of the machinery at work before describing the framework of administration from outside. The people understand their District Officer best; of their Governor they have probably heard something; but the relation in which India stands to England, and the various counterchecks by which a theoretic despotism is modified, are to them unknown.

The political constitution of India is regulated by a series of Acts of Parliament, which culminate in the Act of 1858 transferring the government from the Company to the Crown. By that statute it is enacted that India shall be governed by, and in the name of, the Queen [now the Empress] through one of her principal Secretaries of State, assisted by a council. The Secretary of State is a Cabinet Minister; and, according to the practice of the British constitution, he must have a seat in one of the two Houses of Parliament, while his Under-Secretary must sit in the other. Responsibility to Parliament is thus provided, with all that this entails. The Indian Budget is annually submitted to the House of Commons,

though the ways and means are not voted in detail as with the English Budget. Still it is recognised in countless matters that the English Parliament is really the supreme ruler of India. While all local legislation is left to the Council in India, certain subjects are specially reserved to Parliament—such as imposing charges on India for wars beyond her frontier; and the authority of Parliament is occasionally called in to remodel portions of the constitution.

According to the strict letter of the law, the autocrat over India in the last resort is the Secretary of State. Nothing else would be consistent with the theory that the Queen-Empress is sovereign, and that she can only act through a minister. Practically a joint responsibility rests upon the entire Cabinet. That the Viceroy should be appointed by the Premier, and not by the Indian Secretary, is merely one of those anomalies that abound. Another similar anomaly is to be found in the subordination of the Commander-in-Chief in India to the Commander-in-Chief at home.

The Secretary of State is assisted by a consultative Council, created by the same Act of Parliament with himself. This Council consists of fifteen members, who must have had Indian experience, not necessarily as officials; they are appointed for ten years, and each receives a salary of £1200. For purposes of convenience, special departments are allotted to special members; and they relieve the Secretary of a great deal of administrative work. But they bear no political responsibility. They do not come in and go out with changes of ministry. They may not have seats in either House of Parliament. The responsibility, and therefore the supreme decision

in all important affairs, rests with the Secretary, to whom a power is expressly reserved of overriding the votes of his Council, leaving to them only the right of recording dissentient protests.

In India a similar autocratic power is vested in the Viceroy. But the Viceroy, though in one sense the representative of the Queen-Empress, is in another sense subordinate to the Secretary of State. (A similar anomaly is repeated in the case of Ireland. The Viceroy enjoys all the executive authority that is inherent in the Crown; but the working of the constitution places the political responsibility upon his Secretary.) Every order sent to India must be signed by the Secretary; and, so far as affairs relating to India require to be transacted at home, the very existence of the Viceroy is ignored. In other words, the authority of the Viceroy is delegated and local.

The Viceroy is, in his turn, assisted by two Councils, which likewise owe their existence to a series of Acts of Parliament. One of these Councils is executive, the other legislative, having been developed out of the former for the purpose of law making. As in England so also in India, the appearance of autocracy is avoided by requiring the Viceroy to act in all cases through his Council. Every official act of his, whether executive or legislative, runs in the style of the "Governor-General-in-Council." Apart from this Council, the Viceroy is a mere person; it is only in his council-chamber that he becomes clothed with authority. But in this case again his authority is autocratic. The example of Warren Hastings has shown the mischiefs that might arise from a constitutional deadlock. Authority is expressly re-

served to the Viceroy to overrule the majority of his Council in "cases of emergency," whether of an executive or legislative character, and to act independently of them. Such cases have arisen within the last few years.

The Executive Council is the descendant of the councils granted to the old Company by royal charter more than a century ago. It first received parliamentary sanction under what is known as the Regulating Act of 1775. It is composed of six ordinary members, with the Commander-in-Chief as an extraordinary member, who are all appointed, not by the Viceroy but by the Secretary of State. One of them is a legal member, usually a barrister of English experience; another is the finance member, who also is sometimes appointed from England; the others are high Indian officials, who may not at the same time fill any other post. They all receive the prefix of Honourable. This Council, or at least some of its members, must be present with the Viceroy to give validity to his official acts. Its meetings are not open to the public. In certain respects, it may be compared with the English Cabinet, though its constitutional status is different. Its chief duties are to discuss and decide upon questions of domestic and foreign policy, and to prepare measures for the Legislative Council.

The Legislative Council is composed of the preceding, together with from six to twelve "additional members for making laws and regulations." These additional members are likewise addressed as Honourable. They are appointed by the Viceroy from among high officials, other English residents, and prominent representatives of the native community. The Governor of the Province in which the Council may happen to meet has a seat *ex officio*.

The meetings of this Council are held in public, with the Viceroy as president. The procedure permits debate and division. The general practice is to publish the draft bills several times in the *Gazette*, and also to submit them beforehand to the criticism of the several Governors of Provinces. On receiving the express assent of the Viceroy, bills passed by the majority of the Council become law; but they are still liable to be disallowed by the Secretary of State at home, who thus again reappears as the supreme sovereign of India.

It remains to state that the Governors of Madras and Bombay have each two Councils of their own, modelled after those of the Viceroy. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal has a Legislative Council only. The other Governors of Provinces have no Councils and no legislative power.

The existing body of law in India proceeds from many different sources. First, the Imperial Parliament, whose authority of course extends to India, though the statutes directly affecting India are mostly of a constitutional rather than a municipal nature; second, the Council of the Viceroy, which has been busily engaged during the past ten years in codifying certain branches of legislation, and adapting the old system to new needs; third, the Councils of Madras, Bombay, and Bengal, whose acts are local in their area, and most frequently administrative in their scope; fourth, the Regulations or enactments of the old Councils that preceded the present bodies, most of which are also administrative; fifth and last, the Hindu and Muhammadan law, as interpreted by our courts, including the customs of special castes and tribes.

The judicial authority in India has always been distinct from the executive. The three presidency capitals of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, and also Allahabad, have each a High Court, presided over by a Chief Justice, and manned partly by officials, and partly by English or native barristers. These possess original and appellate jurisdiction, both in civil and criminal cases; and appeal lies from them to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England. The Punjab has a Chief Court; in the other Provinces the highest judicial authority is styled Chief Commissioner. The ordinary administration of justice is entrusted either to a special staff or to the executive officers, according to a distinction that will be explained presently. The lower ranks of the judicial service are largely filled by natives; and there is at the present time one native judge on the Calcutta bench.

So far we have only described the constitution of the supreme government from an organic point of view. The actual working of the government in the several provinces is a very different matter and much more complicated. As already stated, the Provinces—or rather, the Governors of the Provinces—enjoy a large measure of administrative independence. The Viceroy is indeed supreme, but not as a French minister of the interior is supreme. He is not the head of a centralised bureaucracy, but rather the Prime Minister of a cabinet. His control over policy is active, his intervention in affairs is remote and rare. And—what is of yet more significance—his authority (though nominally supreme everywhere) is exercised differently in the different Provinces.

The administration of India bears many traces of its gradual development by stages of conquest. It has never



been remodelled and rendered uniform throughout. The very names can be explained only by an appeal to history. In theory there are still three presidencies, and three presidencies only. These are Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. The two latter remain as they were constituted at the beginning of the present century; Bengal is no longer a presidency in anything but name. There is still a Bengal army, and a Bengal civil service; but there is no Province of Bengal. What is popularly known by that name ought to be called the Lower Provinces. It is larger than the Bengal of geographers, and much smaller than the nominal presidency of Bengal. This last can only be described as comprising whatever is not part of Madras or Bombay. It includes the Punjab, the Central Provinces, and British Burmah. The civil services of Madras and Bombay are confined to their own presidencies, their members being rarely admitted even to posts under the supreme government. But the Madras army, and to a less extent the Bombay army, regularly garrison portions of territory that are really Bengal. More depends upon this distinction than might at first appear. Madras and Bombay retain certain prerogatives; the other provinces that make up Bengal are more directly subject to the Viceroy.

Madras and Bombay have each a Governor and a Commander-in-Chief, all appointed from England. In certain matters they correspond directly with the Secretary of State and with the Commander-in-Chief at home. Their Governors have Executive and Legislative Councils of their own, which are miniatures of the Viceroy's two councils. Their civil services and their armies have a separate organisation. Whether these marks of distinc-

tion will continue to exist much longer may be doubted ; their only justification rests upon the accidents of history. But Bengal itself is no less full of administrative anomalies. The Lower Provinces, or Bengal proper, are under the charge of a Lieutenant-Governor, who alone of all Bengal officials has a Legislative Council. The North-Western Provinces, originally known as the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, are also under a Lieutenant-Governor, with whose office the Chief-Commissionership of Oudh has recently been united. The Punjab is a third Lieutenant-Governorship. The rulers of the Central Provinces, of British Burmah, and of Assam are styled Chief Commissioners ; and there are still some outlying tracts of British territory administered by special officers—Ajmir, Berar, and Coorg.

But the complexities of administration have not yet all been enumerated. Underlying the whole runs a division into the Regulation and the Non-regulation Systems, which is again mainly based upon historical accident. "Regulations" was the name given to the legislative enactments of the old Councils under the Company. These enactments chiefly dealt with the constitution of the executive government and the framework of the fiscal system ; they were the first crude attempt to organise a system of administration which should supersede the vague traditions of native despotism and impose general rules for the guidance of European officials. They were of course intended to be universal in their application ; but it was quickly found that a system suitable for the government of long-settled villages was not appropriate for the management of nomad tribes. Hence arose the necessity for exempting certain tracts from hard and fast rules,

and for entrusting the officials in charge of them with a wider discretion. The hill tribes of Southern Bengal were the first example of a Non-regulation District (1820). As time went on, and large areas of fresh territory were acquired by conquest, it was similarly thought unadvisable to impose a rigorous system of administration upon new subjects. The first Governors were often military men, who maintained order by the agency of their staff officers. The Regulations in force in the old Provinces were not so perfect that it might not seem possible to devise a better system altogether *de novo*. Again, the number of covenanted civilians was limited; and it was a tradition of the Indian service that the Regulations could be administered only by civilians. Through all these causes it has come about that all recently-acquired Provinces belong to the Non-regulation type. The Punjab, as organised by the two Lawrences, affords the most conspicuous example. The Central Provinces are also Non-regulation; so is British Burma; so is Assam; so is Sind, which is attached to Bombay. Madras is the only presidency throughout which the Regulation System may be said to prevail uniformly, though even in Madras the hill tribes of the north are treated according to a less rigid system.

Of late years the practical importance of the distinction between Regulation and Non-regulation has tended to diminish, as the entire population has grown habituated to the English rule, and as various codes of procedure have been enacted for the whole empire. But a few important points of difference still remain. First, in Non-regulation Districts the executive and judicial functions are united in the same hands; in Regulation

Districts the Collector and the Judge are two separate persons, in distinct departments of the service. Secondly, Non-regulation Districts may be distinguished by the title of Deputy-Commissioner, which takes the place of Collector. Thirdly, the highest appointments are not confined to the covenanted service, but are open to military officers on the staff and to uncovenanted civilians.

As has been already stated, the Province is the highest unit in Indian administration, as the District is the lowest. Theoretically the two presidencies of Madras and Bombay enjoy a larger show of independence; but in practice the Viceroy does not interfere any more with the Governors of the rest, though these are supposed to be only his deputies. The autonomy of each Province is marked by its peculiarities of administration. It has its own land system, which no one not bred to it can attempt fully to comprehend. It has certain special features in the organisation of its executive which are sure to be scrupulously cherished. Probably it has a language (or at least a dialect) of its own, and some special castes or races. Its officials are permanently stationed within its limits, and come to regard it as their adopted home. In this way a sort of local *esprit de corps* has sprung up which, it must be admitted, is stronger among the Europeans than in the native element. Still, the Province seems to supply a centre round which the sentiment of nationality may some day gather.

The tendency of recent reforms has been to foster this nascent germ of provincial life. The Viceroy, seated with his court at distant Simla during the greater part of the year, has become less of an active administrator and more of a general controller. It is his duty to

look after the common concerns of the whole empire and to balance rival interests. The actual work of stimulating improvement must be left to the several Governors. With this increase of responsibility has come a perceptible increase of power. Under the Company a Provincial Governor was little better than he had been under the Mughals—a tax-gatherer for the central authority. He had the odium of levying the revenue, but none of the legitimate pleasures of spending it; he could not remit a farthing or employ an additional policeman without express sanction from above. He was responsible for good government, but had neither the authority nor the money to effect reforms. Lord Mayo was the first Viceroy to take a step towards decentralisation, and each of his successors has moved further in the same direction. Control over the purse is the secret of all power; and the supreme government has now parted with some of this control in favour of the Provincial Governors. They still pay all into the Imperial treasury; but a certain proportion is now refunded to them for local objects, and they are authorised to devise new sources of revenue which shall not be taken from them. Provincial finance is the keystone of provincial progress. As might be expected, the rich Province of Bengal has hitherto profited most from the freedom allowed to it.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION.

THE finances of India form a repellent and vexed subject, which it is impossible to discuss adequately, and impossible altogether to omit. We shall not attempt to reconcile all the difficulties or to explain all the details. Speaking roughly, the average gross revenue and the average gross expenditure each amount to about 60 millions sterling a year. Of the gross revenue about 20 millions or two-sixths are derived from the land-tax, 10 millions more from opium, and another 10 millions from railways, irrigation, post office, and such like remunerative services. Deducting these items, the total actually raised by taxation is reduced to about 20 millions a year, or about 2s. per head of population. Whether this incidence should be considered heavy or light must depend upon the estimate we may form of the standard of wealth among the people. The gross expenditure is not so easily analysed. It must be enough to state that the army costs 16 millions, that the interest of the debt amounts to 5 millions, and that about 5 millions more are annually expended upon public works. The total amount of the debt is about 150 millions, bearing interest at the average rate of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

Large figures of this kind cannot be made to yield their true lesson without a good deal of manipulation. For many reasons Indian accounts are specially confusing. They are always kept in the currency of rupees, and the rupee is, for convenience, taken as worth two shillings. The rupee is a silver coin, weighing exactly 180 grains, and containing 165 grains of fine silver. Its intrinsic value is about 1s. 11d.; but its exchange value varies with the ratio of silver to gold, and has been known to fall as low as 1s. 6d. The difference between the exchange value of the rupee and the arbitrary value of two shillings, when multiplied by the number of rupees which the Indian Government has to pay in England, constitutes the item of "loss by exchange," which now figures so prominently in Indian accounts. This item in recent years has averaged about 2½ millions sterling. Of course it is not really a loss but only a matter of account. If India had no payments to make in England the item would disappear. But the Government annually requires to pay about 15 millions in England—partly as interest on debt and railway capital, partly for military and other stores, partly for pensions, and partly for general home charges. In substance this tribute can only be met by the export of commodities; but in form, it is remitted by means of bills drawn by the Secretary of State on the Indian Government, which are sold in London to bankers and merchants who require to make corresponding payments in India for the exports that really form the tribute.

Another source of confusion arises from the changes that are perpetually being made in the form of the Indian accounts, preventing comparison of one year with

another. But what is of most importance to be considered is the difference between the duties of the State in India and in England. In England the State conducts the business of the post office and the telegraphs, but nothing else. The Indian State is the owner of the entire country, a great manufacturer of opium and salt, a maker and worker of railways and canals, a maker of roads and bridges—and generally, the promoter of all kinds of material improvement. The revenue, therefore, is swollen by receipts from all these sources, and the expenditure hardly less.

The incidence of taxation demands a more minute examination. About one-third of the whole gross revenue is derived from the land-tax, which yields 20 millions a year. That a share in the produce of the soil should be reserved to the State is a rule found universally prevalent throughout the East. Where all alike live from agriculture no more just form of taxation is conceivable. Whether it be called rent or not is immaterial. From the point of view of political economy it is not rent, provided that the rate of assessment be less than a rack rent. As a matter of fact, it is everywhere much less than a rack rent. In some cases a second rent is paid by the actual cultivators. From time immemorial the people have been accustomed to yield a portion of their crops to their immediate ruler. It was the Mughal emperors who founded a system of land administration, under which this share of the crops due to the immediate ruler became a fixed tribute, payable to the central authority. In Muhammadan times Governors were practically identical with tax-collectors; the whole machinery of administration, such as it was, was organised with



this sole object. The English inherited this machinery, but found themselves unable to make it work. Both in Bengal and in Madras the early attempts to enforce a regular payment of the land revenue were unsuccessful. In Bengal the difficulty was evaded rather than solved by the Permanent Settlement of Lord Cornwallis (1793), which converted revenue-collectors into landlords, and sold the reversionary interests of the State, without much regard to the cultivator, in exchange for the prospect of regular payment. To this day the Bengal government looks only to the *zamindar*, or landholder, to pay a demand fixed nearly a century ago; the actual cultivators are mere tenants and sometimes only tenants at will. This may be convenient for the State, and pleasantly suggestive of English land tenure; but it is certainly not the traditional system of India.

In Madras the attempt made in the early years of the present century to create a similar body of landlords resulted in failure. Mainly through the personal influence of Sir Thomas Munro another system was adopted, which is in theory the most equitable that could be devised, though none the less an innovation on native customs. This is the *raiyatwari* system, according to which the State recognises no one but the occupier of cultivated land, and assesses him, or rather his fields, upon certain recognised principles. The assessment is called the "settlement"—a word which lies at the root of every explanation of land tenure in India. The process is one of extreme elaboration. It involves first a survey of the entire area of cultivable land, then an estimate of the produce and of the value of that produce with reference to all the circumstances, and finally an apportionment of

the share which should equitably belong to the State. In early days the operation was conducted roughly, and the assessment was often fixed too high; but after larger experience and more accuracy of appraisement a system has been arrived at which has placed the cultivator in a position of competence and security.

Bombay enjoys a settlement tenure similar to that of Madras, though not so universally spread. It differs mainly in that the assessment is more rigorously levied without reference to the varying circumstances of the occupier. The settlement holds good for a term of thirty years only. The same term of thirty years prevails in the greater part of the North-West Provinces, throughout the Punjab, and throughout the Central Provinces. These are the most recent acquisitions of British conquest, and have a land system that was elaborated by men of large Indian experience. The village is here the unit, not the holding or the field. The assessment is levied upon the owners of the village, who may be either landlords in the English sense, or peasant proprietors with separate rights, or a village community. But the most important feature of the settlement is that it not only assesses the Government revenue, but also fixes and records the entire body of private rights over the land in the village. It is like the court roll of a manor, as it used to be kept in early days—and a good deal besides. Here, again, is a system which, though differing widely from the Madras system, is not less adapted to promote security and competence, and is certainly much nearer the traditions of the people. Oudh has a system of its own, derived from the pacification that followed on the Mutiny, by which the *talukdars*,

of local potentates, were for the most guaranteed in the possession of large estates, with even greater power than the *zamindars* of Bengal. The remote little Province of Assam, where cultivation is still very backward, has likewise a peculiar system, somewhat resembling the *rajatwari* of Madras but much more simple. In British Burmah, for the same reason, the land-tax is very light and the system very simple.

This brief sketch of the land system of India (inadequate as it is) affords a striking example of the complexity of the administration—of its variations in the different Provinces, and of its minuteness of detail. The general result is a land-tax of about 20 millions a year, which goes into the Imperial treasury after deducting costs of collection. This represents an average of about 2s. per head of the total population, and also about 2s. per cultivated acre. The actual rate of assessment varies considerably, according to the fertility of the soil and other artificial advantages; but the average share of the gross produce taken by the State is about six per cent. The proportion of the gross produce exacted by the Mughal Government was one-third, or thirty-three per cent. The natural consequence of this lenience of assessment has been to allow the growth of private property in land, which hardly existed under native rule. The value of the land to its owner must be just the difference between the rate of the government assessment and a rack rent. In Bengal, under the permanent settlement, this difference is very great, and is sometimes divided among a long chain of subordinate tenure holders. As this difference represents property which the holder can either sell, or mortgage,

or realise from an ~~undertenant~~, so also it forms a substantial guarantee to the State for the recovery of arrears. Where the assessment is light, default in payment is almost unknown.

The revenue derived from opium does not require much consideration here. Whatever its other faults may be, it is assuredly not a burden upon the people of India. Economically speaking, it is a contribution to the Indian exchequer by the Chinese, rendered possible by the monopoly which India possesses of the finer qualities of the drug. If the taste of the Chinese were to change, or if India were to lose its monopoly from any cause, the opium revenue would be lost. It is levied in two ways. In Bengal, or more strictly speaking in the neighbourhood of Patna and Benares, the growth of the poppy plant is a State monopoly. The preparation of the drug is conducted by a department of the State; and the net revenue represents the difference between the cost of production and the price that can be got from the Chinese, or rather from Calcutta merchants trading with China. Throughout the rest of British territory the cultivation of poppy is prohibited. But poppy grows luxuriantly in some of the native states of Malwa or Central India; and here also it is prepared for the Chinese market, the duty in this case being levied when it crosses the British frontier on the way to Bombay. In this latter case the rate of duty is fixed from time to time according to the price in the open market at Calcutta.

The duty on salt produces a net revenue of about 6 millions sterling. It is the one impost which reaches the entire population, not excluding the native states. Like

almost all other commodities, salt was the subject of taxation under native rule; but the high rate of duty that now prevails is of British invention, being one of the means contrived by Clive to raise the pay of the civil service and place its members above corruption. The duty is still collected in various ways—on Cheshire salt imported at Calcutta, on licensed salt-pans along the entire eastern coast, at special manufacturing depôts in Bombay, at the salt lakes of Rajputana, and at the salt mountains in the northern Punjab. The great reform of Sir John Strachey has recently tended to equalise the rate of duty at these different centres of collection. The standard rate is now Rs. 2-8 per *maund*, or about 7s. a hundredweight, which may be taken as about twelve-fold the cost price. In other words, salt, a prime necessary of life, is taxed in India at the same rate as tobacco is taxed in England. It has been calculated that each family of three persons pays for salt duty 1s. 9d. per annum, or about four days' wages of a labouring man and his wife.

The excise duties, which yield a net revenue of about 2½ millions sterling, stand in no need of justification. They are levied solely upon spirituous liquors and intoxicating drugs, at a comparatively high rate, which is intended as much to check consumption as to produce revenue. It has not been found possible to tax tobacco and *pān* or betel leaf, both of which are used by all classes of men and women throughout the country.

Customs have ceased to be an important item in the Indian Budget since the last of the duties on imported cotton goods was repealed. About 1½ millions ster-

ling is all that customs now bring in, of which about one million comes from an export duty on rice, and the remainder from import duties on European liquors and on metals. The duty on rice has been justified by the argument that British Burmah possesses a practical monopoly of the rice trade of the world. The customs duty on liquors will probably always continue, together with the countervailing excise duty; but with this single exception India may shortly be expected to set an example to the world of absolute free trade.

Stamps yield about 3 millions sterling, showing an incidence of 3½d. per head of population. As in England, this is a complex item; but it may be roughly stated that two-thirds of the total is derived from judicial fees (being thus a tax on litigation), and the remainder from stamps proper on deeds of transfer and commercial documents.

There remains a petty item of assessed taxes amounting to about half a million sterling. This represents all that is left of the attempt to reintroduce the income-tax, abolished under Lord Northbrook's viceroyalty. There can be no doubt that the rich trading classes have prospered greatly under British rule, and equally no doubt that they escape almost entirely from our system of taxation. There is in India no direct taxation, corresponding to our income-tax, our probate duty, our legacy and succession duties. But, on the other hand, it should be recollected that England is the only country in the world that does tolerate direct taxes. In India nothing can be more abhorrent to the people than the inquisitorial procedure connected with an income-tax. All that has been found possible is to establish a license

tax on traders, falling at about the rate of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on their incomes. All incomes of less than Rs. 500 a year are exempt; and this limit may fairly be said to coincide with £200 in England. It results that only about 250,000 traders in all are subject to the tax.

Railways and irrigation works naturally fall to be treated in connection with finance, for the accounts of both are included in the state Budget. Railways were introduced into India by Lord Dalhousie, and were originally planned with a view to military requirements. The great trunk-lines that connect Bombay with Calcutta and Madras, and Calcutta with Delhi, were all constructed by private companies, to which Government gave the land free and guaranteed interest at the rate of 5 per cent. Some of these companies have never yet earned as much as 5 per cent; others earn now a good deal more, and the surplus is divided equally with the state. The East India Railway Company, which runs up the valley of the Ganges and is also the fortunate owner of rich coal-fields, has recently been bought up by the state, according to the terms of the original concession. On the whole, the guaranteed railways pay their way. The total capital expended on them amounts to nearly 100 millions sterling, for which there has been laid about 6000 miles of broad-gauge line. The second class of railways, known as state railways, dates from the time of Lord Mayo. They have all been constructed directly by the state from its own resources, though some of them are worked by the private companies. For the most part they are feeders to the trunk railways, or subordinate lines filling up gaps in the original scheme. For the most part also they have been

laid on the narrow or *mètre* gauge. For all these reasons their working has not yet been made remunerative. Yet a third class of railways has been called into existence more recently. These are to be constructed by private companies, to which Government concedes certain privileges, and also guarantees interest, but only at the lower rate of 4 per cent and for a limited period.

Irrigation has already been described as the primary condition upon which agriculture depends in many parts of India. Most frequently it is managed by the enterprise of the cultivators themselves, who dig wells or build tanks, clear out channels or throw up embankments, as the local circumstances require. But in some places irrigation schemes on a grand scale have been undertaken by the state. These schemes are of two kinds: either a river is diverted by a weir into a new channel so as to water the tract parallel to its bed before left barren, or it is spread by the same means over a delta so as to drench a soil naturally fertile. The former is the method of Northern India, the latter the method of the eastern coast. How much has been expended upon these irrigation works, and how much profit they return, it is impossible to calculate accurately, for the accounts are mixed up with those of land revenue. That some irrigation schemes pay handsomely is beyond dispute; but it should also be stated that the two companies which attempted to construct similar works of their own have both ended in financial failure. The Government, as universal landlord and as protector against famine, can afford costly experiments which would ruin private individuals.



## CHAPTER VII.

### THE EFFECTS OF BRITISH RULE IN INDIA.

HAVING given a brief sketch of the country and the people and of the system of administration as seen from without, it remains to combine these two descriptions and to endeavour to form an estimate of the results of British rule in India. The difficulty of such an attempt will be appreciated best by those who have studied the facts for themselves. The books and articles that have recently been written about India are legion, and as bewildering by their differences as by their number. To keep a clear head amid this chorus of discordant voices might seem a hopeless task. Nevertheless, the duty must not be shirked of endeavouring to give an answer to the most momentous question that an Englishman can ask himself—Ought the natives of India to thank us for our presence in their country and for what we have done there?

Nothing could be conceived more divergent than the statements of the two schools of opinion on the subject. On the one hand, we have a clever band of pessimist critics, who are able to produce a cloud of alarming figures, and who have compelled attention by the bitter-

ness of their diatribes. According to them, India is being exploited by Englishmen for their own benefit; the selfishness of the governing class is only equalled by their ignorance; the revenue system is an exaction, and the judicial system licensed perjury; the country is exhausted by its exports and the soil worn out; the people are ever on the verge of starvation, and in permanent bondage to the moneylenders.

On the other hand, we have the optimistic views of official circles, which sound too pleasant to be true. Much is said of the *Pax Britannica*, which not only guards India from the very fear of invasion, but also quells disorder and maintains justice throughout the land. Much is said of the paternal kindness of the Government, which lavishes millions to avert or assuage famine, constructs irrigation works and railways, subsidises education broadcast, and confers rights of property upon the poorest cultivators. We hear, too, of commerce advancing by leaps and bounds, of revenue increasing, despite reductions of taxation, of great public works to balance a moderate national debt, of new industrial enterprises fostered by the state, and of a population steadily growing in numbers.

It is not necessary to dispute here the allegations of either side. After making considerable allowance for high colouring, we might possibly agree to admit both sets of facts, and should yet be no nearer to a satisfactory conclusion. As in all political discussions, the real issue turns upon the point of view from which the facts are regarded. That we ought never to have gone to India at all, and that our alien rule there cannot be right—these are the sentiments that supply the standpoint of

the pessimists. The consciousness that highly-educated English gentlemen are not likely to turn into tyrants, and become knaves or fools, when transported to another clime, is the justification for those who are content to accept the official view. To the former we have to urge that practical politicians must accept facts. India belongs to England; and until that connection is severed, the great wrong (if it be a wrong) must not blind us to the more or less of good that we are doing there. So, again, with the latter party. Granting that Englishmen will do their duty, still we ought to watch the rulers of India more vigilantly than we watch our own rulers, for they are far off and irresponsible.

Leaving for the present the broad question of moral right and wrong, let us examine some of the subordinate matters upon which the two schools of opinion differ so widely. And first, has the material condition of the people been made better by a century of British rule? For a right answer to this question it is not enough to compare the state of India at the time when the Mughal empire had fallen to pieces with the state of India as it now is. We must attempt to form a conception of what native rule—Hindu or Muhammadan—generally was through a series of generations; and over against that historical picture we must set the picture of an ideal British province—pure Orientalism by the side of imported civilisation.

In Indian history nothing is more striking than the contrast between the instability of thrones and the permanence of social conditions. Dynasties succeed one another with bewildering rapidity; capital cities are built and as quickly abandoned; but the life of the village

—its agriculture and simple handicrafts—goes on absolutely unchanged through centuries. Real history begins with the Muhammadan invasion; but even before that time we have abundant evidence to show that the early Hindu kingdoms had their own vicissitudes, which were often connected with sectarian quarrels. Buddhists, Brahmanists, Sivaites, Vishnuvites, Lingayats, and Jains used to settle points of religious orthodoxy with the sword. The Musalmans introduced a new faith and a set of alien rulers. Their repeated crescentades through India were marked by much bloodshed and outrage; and when they had settled down as conquerors, they were often guilty of intolerance and rapine. But, from a broad point of view, it cannot be said to have mattered much to the general population whether they were ruled by Muhammadans or Hindus. Many of the Muhammadan rulers were of Indian blood; all became Indians. The collection of revenue was more rigorously enforced under the Mughals, but the system of taxation was still the old native one. Setting aside, then, the frequent recurrence of dynastic change, we may assume that the material condition of the people at any one time is typical of what it was at every time.

All early visitors to India—Greek, Arabian, or Italian—marvelled at the high degree of civilisation which the Indians had attained. Crowded cities, laborious agriculture, skilful manufactures, brisk commerce, graceful architecture—all these are indigenous to the soil. As in ancient Egypt, or ancient Babylonia, many centuries of traditional culture had produced a social organisation that was eminently adapted to the race and to the country. From the industrial point of view, this

organisation was capable of producing the great results that remain to this day; from the moral side it satisfied the needs of human nature, if it did not stimulate them; politically, it was not progressive. Social life, indeed, was more varied in those days than it is now. The numerous native courts were so many centres for the satisfaction of ambition and the encouragement of enterprise. All the arts flourished, and with them urban life. Colonies of workmen settled in the large towns, and acquired a skill in manipulation that seems wonderful at the present day. Traders and bankers accumulated wealth, which they could not have done had property been altogether insecure. During the eighteenth century Surat was the great emporium of trade with Europe; and the estimates of its population at that time vary from 400,000 to 800,000 souls. When Clive entered Murshidabad, the capital of Bengal, in 1757, he wrote of it:—"This city is as extensive, populous, and rich as the city of London, with this difference, that there are individuals in the first possessing infinitely greater property than in the last city." In 1664, Sivaji, the great Mahratta leader, pillaged Surat, and is said to have carried off a booty of 1 million sterling. The Peacock Throne of Shah Jahan (1628-58) was valued by the jeweller, Tavernier, at 6½ millions. When Nadir Shah, the Persian, sacked Delhi in 1729, his plunder was estimated at 9 millions. The English gains after Plassey were more than 2 millions.

But it may be argued that such great accumulations of wealth are not inconsistent with general poverty. Of this poverty we have no evidence. We know that Akbar managed to raise a net revenue of more than

40 millions sterling from an area considerably less than that of British India; and this revenue was doubled under his successors. Mughal ministers were, no doubt, extortionate; but these figures could not possibly have been maintained over a series of years unless agriculture had been flourishing and the people well-to-do. India probably reached her zenith of prosperity during the seventeenth century. After the death of Aurangzeb (1707) anarchy began; the ravages of the Mahrattas caused widespread distress, and it must be admitted that the first generation of English rulers helped to drain the country of its inherited riches. But the natural resources of India were as actively developed under native rule as they have ever been since. The cultivation of so fertile a soil must always leave a large surplus, which was then retained in the country to support a variety of ranks and handicrafts. It was the manufactured wares of India, not its raw products, that first attracted European traders. The fine muslins, the rich silks and brocades, the harmonious cotton prints, were long the despair of our own manufacturers.

Agriculture has undergone no change in India for centuries. The traditional methods, though simple, are excellently adapted to the soil and to the climate. Our model farms have taught the native cultivators nothing, nor have we introduced a single new crop, except in some parts the potato. Millets over the larger half of the country, rice in the rainy lowlands, and wheat in the dry north-west, have always been the staple food grains, with a variety of pulses, pot herbs, condiments, and oilseeds. The peasants know with minute accuracy when to sow and when to reap their successive harvests;

nor are they so ignorant as has been thought of the practice of rotation and of manuring. But above everything else they depend upon the water-supply. This they have learned of themselves to husband and direct, whether by means of canals, or tanks, or wells, or embankments. Many of the ancient works display no mean engineering skill, and the most successful British undertakings have been those that follow native lines. Natural calamities, or rather overwhelming catastrophes, occurred then as now. Droughts, floods, and cyclones, occasionally swept away harvest and man and beast; but as regards temporary scarcity, it may be doubted whether it was not more easily borne under the simple conditions of those days. On the other hand, the list of former causes of famine included war.

That the entire surface of India has never before been so densely populated as at the present time may be admitted. But it is not so certain that the richer tracts now support more than they once did. The recent increase has chiefly been in provinces where there is abundance of waste land; and even of this waste land it must be recollected that much had been cultivated at some previous period. The case of Oudh should induce us to distrust vague statements about the growth of population under British rule. That province was annexed in 1856 on the ground of intolerable misgovernment. In the following year the Mutiny broke out, and for more than twelve months civil war raged in every district. We should expect therefore to find the number of the people, if not small, at least rapidly increasing. But the actual figures, so far as they show anything, show the actual converse. The first census

of Oudh was taken in 1868, only ten years after the Mutiny, and it gave a total of 11,220,233 souls, being 468 per square mile, or more than 1 to every cultivated acre. This was by far the greatest density in India, that of Bengal being only 383, and that of the North-Western Provinces being 378. But this is not all. The second census of Oudh was taken in 1881, and showed an increase of less than 200,000 souls, or only 1·6 per cent in thirteen years, as compared with an increase of 35 per cent in British Burmah, and of 25 per cent in the Central Provinces. No famine or other exceptional event had intervened. From this we learn two things—first, that a province scarcely recovered from native misrule and all the horrors of war could yet maintain a man to every acre; and second, that the increase under British Government has been insignificant, probably not greater than the increase of cultivation. It is evident from these figures that native rule (or misrule, if the phrase be preferred) is not incompatible with a dense population. The truth is that the population of India (like that of every other country) will always be just as dense as the circumstances permit and never any denser. In India emigration is not one of the circumstances that have to be considered. Agriculture, indeed, is there the sole circumstance. Where waste land permits, population increases fast, only less fast than in America; elsewhere it increases slowly, if at all. The cause that here prevents the increase (directly or indirectly) is simply want of food. This must ever be so where agriculture forms the sole occupation of the people; and just in proportion to the degree that other industries existed in the old days,



so had the population a larger margin within which to increase.

„ When we turn to the material condition of the people under British rule, we find the primary principles reversed. The central government has become stable, while the rural population seems to be losing its secular equilibrium. We have introduced into India the European conception of a state, with a minutely-organised administration, backed by irresistible force. This we have done deliberately, under the honest belief that we were thereby conferring the greatest of political benefits. But we have unawares poured new wine into old bottles. The change has indeed been slow, and is by no means yet finished. The first few generations of English rulers left things pretty much to take their course. They attempted, with more or less success, to fit themselves into their Oriental surroundings. In their time the condition of the people must have been almost the same as under native rule, except that local courts no longer afforded opportunities to the energetic and employment to artisans. But within the last thirty years a revolution has been wrought in the views of the Governors and in the condition of the governed, which is proceeding with accelerated rapidity. The revolution dates from the epoch of Lord Dalhousie, who carried out into practice his doctrine that the blessings of British rule should be forced upon the people. The theory implied in this doctrine received a temporary check from the Mutiny. It has since been indirectly stimulated by the results of steamships and railways, and directly by the most active English administrators.

The consequences may be seen everywhere, but more

especially in the land system, for this is the one point of our administration that is felt in every home. As has been already stated, the land system varies in the different provinces, but the more important features are common to every province but Bengal. The assessment is struck after a most elaborate calculation, and the average rate cannot be thought high in consideration of the increase of price that has taken place. It is fixed for a long term of years, with the object of allowing the occupier to derive any profit from the probable increment. No Irish farmer could ask for more, yet the results have not answered the expectation. Over large tracts the cultivating class is not only impoverished but demoralised; hardly anywhere can they be said to be prosperous. It has rarely been argued that the evil is caused by rack-renting. If that were all, it could be easily remedied. It is caused by the introduction of a rigid system, to which the people were not accustomed. Under native rule the assessment was probably no less high, and occasionally it may have been extracted by torture; but custom allowed it to vary with the proceeds of the harvest, and there was always a chance of evasion and, in the last resource, of flight. The insistence even of a Mughal tax-gatherer was tempered by a regard for future supplies. According to our theory, bad years ought to be set off against good; but the simple husbandman is unable to keep for himself even the profits of good years. He is permanently under the power of the moneylender, who is the only person that has benefited by a low assessment and rigorous collection. While the revenue officers are compelled to proceed against the defaulting peasant, the judicial courts offer

every facility, to the astute moneylender, who knows precisely how and when to take proceedings. Such is the result of the application to India of the European maxims of fixed taxation and ready justice. The mischief, however, has been recognised by the Government; and three measures of relief are now under consideration: (1) To shelter the peasant against his natural enemy by altering the law of debt and mortgage in his favour; (2) To empower the Collectors to postpone and even remit revenue; (3) To establish land banks under official patronage, which shall be content with a moderate rate of interest. The aim of these reforms is no less benevolent than was the aim of the original assessment; but when the traditional stability of village agriculture has once been disturbed, it is impossible to predict how it will again settle down.

Take, again, the question of the wealth of the country at large. The total population is certainly larger (probably, much larger) than it has ever been at any previous period, which is equivalent to saying that more land is now under cultivation. That the population is advancing, or will advance, too rapidly for the capacity of the soil to support it, we do not believe. In a purely agricultural country such dangers have their own natural cure. But if the security of British rule has allowed the people to increase, it does not follow that it has promoted the general prosperity. That could only be done in one of two ways—either by producing a distinct rise in the standard of living among the lowest class, or by diverting a considerable section of the people from the sole occupation of agriculture. It is needless to point out that neither of these things has been done. Competent

authorities, indeed, are of opinion that the condition of the lowest class has become worse under British rule. Sir Richard Temple expresses himself as doubtful on this point. Dr. W. W. Hunter estimates that one-fifth of the total population, or 40 million persons, "go through life on insufficient food." To improve the general standard of comfort of this miserable class is beyond the reach of any external measures. But possibly their sole dependence upon agriculture might be modified by the creation of other means of livelihood, and thus the pressure on the soil be lessened. Something has already been accomplished in this direction. And here it becomes important to point out that it is not dependence upon agriculture generally but dependence upon the local food crop in particular, that constitutes the mischief. A community entirely engaged in agriculture, or even entirely engaged in raising food crops, may be comparatively well-to-do, if not prosperous. This may be seen in the case of the Western States of America, or even in the case of British Burmah. The whole matter turns upon two questions—whether the cultivators produce more than they consume? and what becomes of the surplus? Throughout India the conditions vary. In Burmah and in parts of Eastern Bengal there is a considerable surplus; in the irrigated tracts of the north-west, in the Madras deltas, and in the cotton districts of Bombay and Central India, a fair surplus; in the rest of the country, probably very little. Whether that surplus takes the form of rice, or jute, or wheat, or cotton, is immaterial. Secondly, what becomes of this surplus? That it is practically all exported does not affect the present argument. We want to find out

now who enjoy the immediate benefits of it. These might be appropriated by the state, as indeed they are to a limited extent, by means of an augmented land-tax and an export duty on rice; and thus they would tend to relieve the burthen of taxation proper. They might be intercepted by landlords in the form of rent; but even under the *zamindari* system of Bengal this is hardly the case to any appreciable degree. They might again be allowed to remain with the cultivators themselves, so far at least as the non-interference of the state can allow them to remain there; and this, we are glad to believe, happens in Burmah and parts of Bengal. The cultivators here are probably as well off as any peasantry in the world. Their prosperity is evidenced by their display of silver ornaments, and their purchases of clothing. Lastly, and as a subordinate alternative, these surplus profits which the law leaves to the cultivators they may by their own folly transfer to the moneylenders. We have too much reason to fear that this has occurred in the richest portions of Bombay.

A further question, not unconnected with those we have been considering, is concerned with the destination of the surplus. Under native rule it was of necessity consumed in the country.<sup>4</sup> It went either to support the luxury of courts, or to encourage local manufactures. In either event it tended to promote variety in political and social life, which is in itself a good thing. At the present time by far the larger portion is exported, and thus fails to influence any other people in the country than its own producers. To talk of this export as a drain upon India is inaccurate. If a Government

spends its revenue or a landlord his rent, or a capitalist his dividends in a foreign land, such expenditure may be termed a loss to the home country. But, as already said, the greater part of the surplus we are talking about does not come under any of these heads. It is substantially the property of the peasant, which he barter with England for silver and cloth. During the past forty years, India has consumed English cotton manufactures to the aggregate value of more than 400 millions sterling and has absorbed 300 millions of treasure.

Yet one other aspect of the matter deserves to be mentioned. It is sometimes alleged that the exports must be a loss to the country, because in former days the surplus was not exported but consumed. In so far as the surplus existed in former days, and was then either appropriated by the state or exchanged against local manufactures, this argument has some justification—if not from the point of view of political economy, at least from that of national well-being. But the real answer to it is that the surplus did not exist in former times to anything like the same extent as now. It has been created, not so much by the security of British rule as by the extraordinary activity of modern trade. Jute has been invented, if we may so say, within the last thirty years. Improvements in means of transport give an altogether new value to industry. In an isolated country there is little encouragement to increase production, and the bounty of Nature may result in mere waste. When there is no external market a harvest above the average becomes an evil rather than a benefit. Not only will part of the crops be left to rot on the fields, but also the excessive cheapness upsets the simple social

economy. Of this many examples will occur to those familiar with Indian history. Mr. Lindsay, Supervisor of Sylhet in Assam towards the end of the last century, reported that the rice harvest in two successive years had been so plentiful that "the farmers were totally unable to pay their rents." As late as the year 1870 it was recorded in a Bengal Administration Report that the peasants of Dinájjpur grumbled because the season was too favourable. Nor is there any ground for the assertion sometimes made that crops grown for export are unduly encroaching upon the area devoted to food. It is true that a sudden demand, such as that caused by the recent famine in Southern India, may deplete the stores of grain which every Indian peasant lays up against a bad season. But where the demand is fairly constant, the supply is always derived from the superfluity. It will be found universally that the great exporting districts of India are not only the most prosperous but also the least liable to suffer from scarcity. Railways, canals, and steamships are probably the most unmixed benefits that England has conferred upon India; and of these we are disposed to place steamships first.

If we turn to the classes not engaged in agriculture, we shall probably be forced to the conclusion that their state has not improved under British rule. The weavers have suffered conspicuously. From some parts of the country this caste has almost disappeared, and everywhere it is in a decaying condition. Lancashire has attained its pre-eminence by annihilating the indigenous industry—first by prohibitive duties in England, and then by the competition of machinery. The recent establishment of steam mills at Bombay and elsewhere

affords a poor compensation for the variety of social life once spread through the country. With the weavers have gone the numerous caste of dyers. In the same way many other handicrafts have suffered either from the abolition of the native courts or from English rivalry. Carpet-making, fine embroidery, jewellery, metal work, the damascening of arms, saddlery, carving, papermaking, even architecture and sculpture, have all alike decayed. In some cases the change is to be regretted, not only as impairing the social economy, but as an absolute loss to the artistic treasures of the world. Processes have been forgotten, and hereditary aptitudes have fallen into disuse, which can now never be restored. An India supplying England with its raw products, and in its turn dependent upon England for all its more important manufactures, is not a picture that we can expect the Indians to contemplate with entire satisfaction.

What answer, then, would a witness, with full knowledge and absolute impartiality, give to the question whether India has benefited by British rule? He would admit that the population has largely increased, and that the aggregate amount of human pleasure (or pain) has been made by so much greater. He would admit that the people, both on British territory and in states still native, are protected against the grosser forms of misrule, and against the storms of cruelty that used occasionally to sweep through the land. He would admit that the British Government has made strenuous efforts, at least in recent years, to ameliorate the condition of the masses. But he would probably doubt whether the good results have been equal to the good intentions. On the general issue he would hardly feel himself justified in pronouncing a final



verdict. A Government can easily obstruct prosperity ; it can do comparatively little to promote it. That must depend, after all, upon the people themselves. The state can maintain peace without and justice within. It can avoid harassing taxation, and can remove artificial restraints upon commerce. But these things are negative rather than positive. They are the absence of wrong rather than the presence of right. They constitute good order. They do not necessarily involve progress. The springs of national development lie deep in human nature, and may escape the reach of an alien administrator who does not possess the divining rod. To introduce the complex machinery of Western civilisation into the simple society of the East is an experiment of which the present generation cannot prudently foretell the result. Japan is trying this experiment with its own native agency. In India the same experiment is being tried on a far grander scale, and the responsibility rests with the people of England.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### THE FUTURE OF INDIA.

BOTH in England and in India it is no longer held inadmissible to discuss possible changes in the connection between the two countries. On the one hand, Englishmen are growing more conscious of the overwhelming burden of empire, and less confident in their capacity for ruling and understanding others. On the other hand, a certain section of the Indians are learning, so far as intellectual instruction can teach them, the means by which nations become great and free. We are educating our subjects to be our equals. It is easy to exaggerate the political influence of education and also the extent to which it has as yet spread in India. But men who speak better English than most Englishmen, who read Mill and Comte, Max Müller and Maine, who occupy with distinction seats on the judicial bench, who administer the affairs of native states with many millions of inhabitants, who manage cotton mills and conduct the boldest operations of commerce, who edit newspapers in English, and correspond on equal terms with the scholars of Europe—these can no longer be treated as an inferior breed. To argue that the vast majority of the people still

remain in their primitive condition, or that, if they have changed, they have only become unsettled, is no answer. A nation must be judged by its leading class, especially when that class is in all important respects homogeneous with the rest. The educated Indian is only superficially Anglicised. During countless generations the race has grown into harmony with its environment, and developed a national character that may be modified but will not be destroyed by foreign influences. The permanence of this national character is the main element of the future with which we have to reckon. To wait until India shall have become English would be to put off her liberation to the Greek Calends.

The Royal Proclamation of November 1, 1858, issued by Lord Canning before the Mutiny was entirely quelled, has always been regarded by the Indians as the charter of their rights. While it announced the transfer of the Government from the Company to the Crown, it also promised that the ancient usages and customs should be preserved inviolate, and that the public service should be open to all without regard to caste or creed. According to constitutional theory, there is no reason why a Hindu or Muhammadan should not be made Viceroy, or why white troops should not be commanded by black officers. As a matter of fact, the proportion of natives who enter the covenanted Civil Service now is less than it was a few years ago; not more than two or three natives have as yet risen to the rank of Collector; and the native army is entirely officered in its higher ranks by Englishmen. Practice is stronger than precept. The *personnel* of the Government remains as predominantly English as it was thirty years ago under Lord

Dalhousie. In some respects it may be said to have become more English as it has become more bureaucratic. The old term "Anglo-Indian" is now almost obsolete; and with it has passed away a type of Englishmen who were half Orientalised. There is no longer an Indian army to produce such men as Malcolm and Munro, Henry Lawrence and Outram, who were not the worse officers because they could read the native mind like an open book, and liked the people as much as they were liked by them. The Civil Service has changed, though not from the same causes. They no longer go out as boys, with no dreams of home-ambition to distract them from their Indian career. They are already men, who have passed through a university course. The former generation went to India as to an adopted country, about which they had probably imbibed many family traditions. The present generation go into temporary exile, meaning no doubt to work hard and do their duty, but meaning no less to save all they can and to come back as often and as soon as possible. Railways, steamers, and the Suez Canal have brought India within three weeks of England. The same agencies that have so greatly stimulated trade have also seriously impaired the efficiency of the administration, by means of "privilege-leave" and "acting-appointments." The concentration of departments in the provincial capitals and the annual migration to "the hills" tend in the same direction. The initiative of the individual officer is now less felt than the pressure of the machine. It is not that the competitive system sends out worse men than nomination. In the opinion of all competent witnesses it sends out far better men. But circumstances conspire

to make them more English and less Anglo-Indian than their predecessors. Countries have often ere now been conquered and obeyed their conquerors, but the rule of an alien bureaucracy is an attempt foredoomed to failure.

And we have taught the Indians to appreciate the change. So long as Government was limited to the simple duties of maintaining order, enforcing justice, and collecting revenue, unreasoning obedience was easy, despite occasional anomalies. The old-fashioned Anglo-Indian did not always make himself loved, but he was respected as belonging to a higher order of humanity. He had a different language, a different education, different thoughts, and a different theory of administration. If the natives could appreciate him at all, it was just in so far as he had adopted some of their ways. This order of things died with the Company. The modern ideal is to transplant the full-grown tree of European civilisation into an Asiatic soil. An active central Government, stimulating material progress, trying experiments in legislation, subsidising education, and allowing liberty to the press, has superseded the lazy reign of individual Anglo-Indians. The whole land is astir with criticism and fresh proposals of reform. And it is of the essence of the new order that the natives should themselves take part in it. Together with our own language we have taught them the lessons of industrial prosperity and of constitutional freedom. By so doing we have indirectly, but not less surely, sapped the foundations of our own supremacy. A stationary India, governed by Anglo-Indians, might conceivably remain stable. A progressive India, with rulers selected

by competitive examination from English and natives indiscriminately, has entered upon an era of change the end of which none can foresee.

The movement is felt everywhere—in religion and in morals, no less than in the domain of politics and industry. Hitherto, the direct effect of Christianity upon India has been insignificant, as compared with the influence exercised in former times by its Mahammadan conquerors. There are a considerable number of native Christians, Catholic and Protestant, among the low castes of the extreme south; and a few of the primitive hill tribes in other parts of the country have also been converted. On the whole, Hinduism and Islam both hold their ground unmoved. But what missionaries have not been able to achieve is now being done by the spread of secular education. A native who has gone to college may come back professing his old form of faith, or a new faith, or no faith at all; but in any case he is intellectually another man. To say that he is on a level of equality with an English university man would be an exaggeration; but he has at least been initiated into a similar world of thought and belief. Few religious movements of our time are more interesting than that founded by Raja Rammohan Rai, and now realised in the Brahma Samaj. And the large majority who outwardly remain orthodox Hindus or orthodox Musalmans have come under the same invigorating influence. Nor are indications lacking that even the condition of women is passing within the shadow of change. The spiritual life of India has never been dead, though to our eyes it may seem unprogressive. Under the stimulus of Western education, which is extending year by year,

it has made a fresh start as full of promise as the Italian Renaissance.

In the political world the new movement is more conspicuous and no less significant. The augmented efficiency of the administrative machine has been accompanied by a more generous toleration of native opinion and greater concessions to the claims of the people. The Indians are no longer voiceless. Native members have seats on the Councils of the Viceroy and of the subordinate Governors. Native judges have reached the highest judicial posts. Newspapers conducted entirely by natives, in English as well as in the vernacular languages, have become a distinct power in the land. The chief municipalities are composed of a majority of elected native members. Not a few native ministers, educated in our schools, have displayed the highest talent and integrity in the government of protected states. All these things, small in themselves, may be regarded as steps in the path of political progress. Even so late as thirty years ago such things had no existence. Down to Lord Dalhousie's time, the received theory even of the most enlightened administrators was—everything *for* the people, nothing *by* them. The English standard of good government was held infallible; and native opinion was assumed to be either non-existent or perverse. In this case it was the Mutiny that caused the awakening. By that terrible shock the lesson was taught that a race, habituated to centuries of subjection still retains some national aspirations, which are dangerous if they do not find a peaceful vent. As soon as armed resistance ceased, the work of pacification began with the grant of fuller privileges to the native chiefs,

and the promise of a wider toleration to the people at large.

So far, it can only be said that a slight beginning has been made towards solving the problem of the future, which may be called the political emancipation of India. The final result can hardly be considered doubtful, whether in the interests of India or of England itself. No English statesman would deliberately advocate the conquest of India, if the work had to be undertaken anew, any more than he would now advocate the conquest of China. We may be yet more sure that the English democracy would never consent to embark on such an enterprise. England has inherited India, with all the burden of responsibility therein implied. Recklessly to abandon India, without regard to what should happen afterwards, upon the hypothetical ground of international duty, would be a confession of political impotence and probably an historic crime. Granting that we have done a wrong to the Indians by conquering their country, the guilt of that wrong would not be purged by a sudden withdrawal. Even from such a point of view, it should be held necessary to make atonement by trying to repair the results of the wrong. Before we can restore India to its own, we must either reconstruct, or permit the reconstruction of, the native fabric of government. Suggestions towards such a work would be the most valuable contribution that the political theorist can offer, for history has no advice or warning to give.

The supreme test of statesmanship consists in the avoidance of revolutions. But this object can only be attained by a prompt recognition of the course of



events, and by a conscious adaptation of means to ends. In India we have hitherto failed to look the facts fairly in the face. Inconsistent theories of our position there require to be reconciled, so that some deliberate policy may be announced, and acted upon. Englishmen in India are for the most part too deeply immersed in details to find time to formulate the principles of a new polity. The more incumbent is it for Englishmen at home, upon whom the responsibility ultimately rests, to ask themselves the question—What are we doing in India? Ought we to contemplate the existing connection as permanent, and merely attempt to alleviate the grievances that the nature of the case or ourselves have caused? Or ought we to regard the emancipation of India as the final aim of our continued presence there, to proclaim it as our duty, and to fit our policy so as to hasten its accomplishment? And here it may be observed that “the emancipation of India” need not necessarily involve a total severance from the British Crown, though it would involve the destruction of English supremacy and the grant of a large measure of local independence. Home Rule for India, as Home Rule has been already conceded to Canada and to the Australian colonies, is by no means inconsistent with the unity of the empire—least of all when we anticipate what the empire will probably be like fifty years hence. And we can press the analogy somewhat closer. Canada is a sort of confederacy; neither Australia nor South Africa has yet entered into the political stage of confederation. India, on the other hand, is only united in external show. In her case Home Rule would mean the restitution of local

independence to twenty different provinces or states, which might well find their common head in England.

As regards our dealings with native states, two facts within the last eight years stand out prominently in contrast to the policy represented by the name of Dalhousie. One is the preservation of the independence of Baroda, despite what may be termed the treason of the Gaekwar; the other is the restoration of Mysore to its hereditary Raja after fifty years of British administration. Here were two native states of the first magnitude, each of which it would have been easy to declare forfeited to the paramount power. For Baroda an infant Gaekwar was found by adoption, and during his minority the entire government was entrusted to an eminent native minister, introduced for the purpose. The case of Mysore is still stronger. The whole staff of English officials has been superseded by natives; and for the first time in history the "red line" on the map of India has receded. Supposing the result to be successful (and up to the present there is no indication that it will be otherwise), we shall have the rare opportunity of watching an experiment in politics which will be full of instruction for the future. For if Mysore prospers under native administration, as Travancore has long prospered, why should English Collectors be necessary for the adjoining Districts of the Madras Presidency?

In the British Provinces it must be admitted that not much has been done towards hastening the ideal of "India for the Indians." The two principal means which seem available are the organisation of local opinion and the gradual but systematic substitution of native for English officers. Even though we proceed slowly, we

must dare to make a beginning at the risk of some mistakes. Everything depends upon the intention with which the first steps are conceived, and the spirit in which they are carried out. As regards the development of local institutions, something has been done within the last few months, at the initiative of Lord Ripon, by two measures which bear—the one directly and the other indirectly—upon the matter. His minute to the Provincial Governments announcing a new policy of municipal self-government, will undoubtedly become an historical document. Hitherto, though the number of municipalities and local boards is legion, these have been little more than committees for registering the decrees of the Collector. With the exception of Calcutta and Bombay, the members were almost everywhere official nominees; and even when elected, the sense of responsibility was weak. Now the people of India possess an instinctive capacity for self-government, which centuries of oppression have not eradicated. This is found even among the hill tribes to such an extent as to have caused students to doubt whether the village community be after all an “Aryan” institution. It lies at the root of the custom of caste, and it has been adapted to found trade guilds scarcely less influential than those in Europe during the Middle Ages. The two main features are the headman, who is found under a variety of names in every village of India; and the *panchayat*, or committee of five, which decides religious disputes, regulates the rate of wages, and at one time dictated to the mutinous Sikh army. Here, then, we have the germ of local government, if not of representative institutions. The problem lies in combining the old

with the new—in reconciling the traditional forms of native authority with the wants of a modern civilisation. If the impulse is made to come from below and not from above, the task ought not to be impossible. At least, here is a work more hopeful than the Settlement of a District, or the codification of some outlying branch of law. The second measure of Lord Ripon's referred to is the Education Commission, which may be regarded for the present purpose as a protest against over-centralisation. The professed object with which it was appointed is to transfer the responsibility for higher education from the state to the people, and thus set free funds for the extension of primary instruction. Government colleges and schools are to be turned into aided institutions, and encouraged to stand alone. The recent tour of the President of the Commission through India has proved how considerable is the local enthusiasm that may be thus aroused.

The substitution of native for English officers is a change admitted to be necessary, and at the same time most difficult. The *esprit de corps* of the covenanted Civil Service pledges it to the support of the existing order, which it is excusably proud to have created, and by which it lives. Nothing is more commonly heard than that natives are unfit for high executive office, and that Englishmen cannot be expected to serve under natives. Both assertions may be disproved by history and by the contemporary experience of native states. A people that has produced Todar Mal and Murshid Kuli Khan, Haider Ali, and Ranjit Singh (not to mention living names<sup>1</sup>) cannot be destitute of adminis-

\* <sup>1</sup> Sir Salar Jang, for thirty years the prime minister of Haidarabad, was still alive when this was written.

trative talent. This talent may not be the same as that displayed by Europeans, but neither is the talent of all European nations identical in kind. The Indians will never believe at heart in our good intentions so long as we keep all the good berths to ourselves. A more genuine obstacle to innovation is presented by the circumstances of the Civil Service. Its members, selected in England by rigorous competition, represent the choicest product of Western culture. From the newly-arrived Assistant Magistrate to the Lieutenant-Governor of a Province, they form an administrative hierarchy, bound together by close ties of loyalty and self-interest. They possess a monopoly of all the most valuable appointments, which they can support by an appeal to the Act of Parliament under which they serve. Considering the conditions of their life—exile from home and often separation from family, and severe duties in a tropical climate—and comparing their income with the prospects they might reasonably have entertained in England, it cannot be said that their average salary is excessive. Their incorruptibility, their energy, their self-sacrifice, are above praise. The work they do is of an altogether exceptional character, which none could perform but themselves. They *are* the administration personified, with all its merits and defects. To introduce discontent among them, would be to shake the whole fabric, which rests upon their devotion scarcely less than upon the might of the army. Yet, after all, the Civil Service exists for India, not India for the Civil Service. To reconcile the interests of each will be a most delicate problem, and it presses for solution. The admission of natives without competition to certain

grades of subordinate office is an idle device, so long as the phalanx of the covenanted Service remains unbroken. Granting that the vested rights (and even the contingent expectations) of individuals must be guarded, and granting also that some degree of European control will be necessary for years to come, the Indians may fairly claim to be entrusted at once with a share of the higher posts — executive as well as judicial. Considerations of economy here coincide with the demands of justice. It will be necessary to look for the native candidates until they are found. Nor must it be said that the experiment will have failed entirely, if it do not entirely succeed. A native administration can never be the same thing as an English administration. To wait for that to come about would be to wait till the Ethiopian shall have changed his skin. But a native administration stimulated by English example, and still supervised by Englishmen, is a not unworthy political ideal.

To fill out the details of a scheme for restoring India to the Indians lies beyond the present purpose. It would not be such a very difficult task when once the general principle is conceded. An English army, or at least an army officered by Englishmen, would probably be required even after the presence of English civilians had become rare; for England, in her capacity of protector, might maintain the obligation of guarding India both against any new conqueror and against internal strife. A confederacy of many states and provinces, each developing peacefully after its own fashion, and are united by a common bond to the English name, is our dream for the twentieth century.



## PART II.—THE COLONIES





## CHAPTER, IX.

### HISTORICAL SKETCH.

COLONIES, in the modern sense of the word, are dependencies beyond the seas, which have been acquired, in the course of the last four centuries, by the commercial nations on the western seaboard of Europe. Their acquisition is due to the great impulse which was given to maritime adventure by the discovery of America, and of the route by sea to India round the Cape of Good Hope. The principal nations which have thus acquired colonies are Spain, Portugal, England, France, and Holland. Denmark and Sweden had each a small share in the movement. Few colonies are now under the control of the nation to which they owe their origin. Many have been transferred, by conquest or cession, from one Power to another: and what were once the principal colonies of Spain, Portugal, and England have severed from their mother-countries, and become sovereign states. The principal existing colonies of England enjoy practical independence under the system of "Responsible Government," which will be hereafter explained: but they still remain British dependencies, and their citizens are British subjects, equally with the inhabitants of the British Isles.

A dependency, in English usage, is any foreign possession annexed to the Crown. One country is not rendered a dependency of another by being under the same sovereign. Hanover, which was during many years under the same sovereigns with Great Britain, is an instance. All colonies are dependencies; but some dependencies do not rank as colonies. The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man are non-colonial dependencies, and, practically form part of the mother-country. Yet the Channel Islanders and the Manks live each under their own laws, and are allowed to impose their own taxes. So far they resemble colonies; but Parliament controls their legislation, and has the power of legislating for them. Their Government business passes, not through the Colonial Office, but through the Home Office. Another dependency not ranking as a colony is the Indian Empire. Ceylon, however, which is an insular fragment of India, ranks as a colony. So does Heligoland, which is situated similarly to the Channel Islands. Aden, a possession resembling the colonies of Gibraltar and Malta, is not a colony, but ranks as part of India. In English usage, therefore, the name of colony is not employed with strict reference to any particular class of foreign possessions, but generally to any dependencies of the Crown the government business of which passes through the Colonial Office.

Until a century ago colonies were universally regarded as exclusive possessions of the mother-country, existing principally for its benefit, and having no rights of their own. The Spaniards, who obtained the lion's share in the New World, considered their colonies mainly as the source of a supply of the precious metals. But both the

Spaniards in the West Indian Islands, and the Portuguese in Brazil, perceived that Europe might use the New World as a place for cultivating tropical produce for her own markets, and began the cultivation of sugar, which was extended in the West Indian Islands by the English and French, and soon came to form the staple of the colonial trade. To the staple of sugar those of coffee and tobacco were soon added. The English and French extended the principle on which these agricultural colonies had been founded. In the northern latitudes of America they saw great tracts of forest having a soil and climate not greatly differing from those of Europe. On the fringes of these great tracts they settled, not to search for gold and silver, like the Spaniards in Mexico and Peru, nor for cultivating sugar, coffee, and tobacco, like the Portuguese in Brazil, and their own countrymen in the West Indies and Virginia, but for the purpose of living as they lived at home, by domestic agriculture and domestic trade. Hence arose those English settlements northward of Virginia which acquired the name of New England, and the French settlements on the St. Lawrence which acquired the name of New France.

The growth of these New English settlements was very rapid; and it carried everything on the North American Continent with it. They grew in numbers along the coast, and spread fast up the rivers in the interior. They absorbed those of the Dutch on the Hudson River, and of the Swedes on the Delaware. Together with the southern colonies of Virginia and Carolina, and the West Indian Islands, they came to form a possession of great importance to English trade, and to the English moneyed interest, on which the

Whigs relied, and were cherished as such by the policy of Whig statesmen. Following the policy of Spain, England forbade her colonies to buy manufactures from other countries, and gave them in return the protection of her fleet, and a practical monopoly in her own markets for their produce. The connection thus established proved a great stimulus to general commerce. To maintain and to extend this profitable connection was a cardinal point of British policy. The powerful fleet, which was employed to protect the colonies from the French, was naturally also employed to increase their number at the expense of France. In the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713), the British fleet seized Nova Scotia. In the Seven Years' War (1757-1763) the British fleet entered the St. Lawrence and seized Canada, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward's Island, and took all the French Islands in the West Indies. All French North America, except the settlement of Louisiana at the mouth of the Mississippi, together with the rich sugar islands of Dominica, St. Vincent, Grenada, and Tobago, was ceded to England at the Peace of 1763, and the old British Colonial Empire thus reached its greatest extent just when the English East India Company, with the British fleet at their back, drove the French from India, and founded the Anglo-Indian empire. Then followed a great reverse. To provide for the defence of this extensive North American empire it was thought necessary to tax its inhabitants. The colonists were willing to tax themselves for this purpose, but they resisted its being done for them by the British Parliament. A conflict ensued, in which Great Britain was worsted, and the thirteen colonies declared themselves

independent, and took the name of the United States of America.

But the Peace of 1783, by which Great Britain acknowledged the independence of the thirteen American colonies which formed the principal part of her colonial empire, left her still mistress of such parts of her American possessions as were commanded by her fleet. Neither the planters of the West Indies in the south, nor the settlers on the River St. Lawrence in the north, had shared in the movement of independence. The reason, in the case of the West Indian Islands, lay in the fact that the planters were not really colonists, but English adventurers engaged in supplying the English market with colonial produce under the protection of a monopoly, and mainly supported in their enterprise by the capital of their consignees at home. In the case of the colonists on the St. Lawrence the reason lay in the fact that most of them were Frenchmen, who had quietly submitted to be transferred from the French to the English Crown, and had no interests nor feelings in common with their revolted neighbours. But, however this might have been, the main cause of their retention was the English fleet. The frigates of Great Britain commanded both the Caribbean Sea and the St. Lawrence. However anxious the West Indian planters and the Canadians might have been to join the United States, they would have been powerless in the face of the British fleet. The United States invaded Canada, but the British fleet, which had won it from France, proved capable of protecting it; and it proved equally capable of protecting the West Indian Islands. The victory of Rodney off Guadalupe, which retrieved the disgrace of Cornwallis's surrender at

Yorktown, exemplifies the command of 'the seas which Great Britain never for an instant lost. There thus remained, close to the independent states of America, two groups of colonies over which Great Britain retained her hold. Both had been won by the fleet ;\* and the St. Lawrence colonies entirely, and the West Indies chiefly, had been won from France.

The wars of the French Revolution afforded England an opportunity, again at the expense of France, of replacing her losses. The allied enemies who in 1793 attacked a disorganised nation, prospectively divided a rich spoil. Austria was to take what she could across her frontier in the Netherlands. Sardinia was to take the country west of Nice, England the French colonies. The only share in this programme which was executed was that of England ; and the English, who spent hundreds of millions in maintaining that memorable twenty years' war against France, recouped themselves by seizing the colonies of France and her allies.

Independently of these additions, the colonies which remained to Great Britain in 1783 were valuable dependencies, though the abolition of the monopoly system impaired their positive value. The commercial policy which had been pursued with regard to the colonies inevitably collapsed with the old colonial empire. The monopoly of the British sugar market, and the maintenance of negro slavery, on which the West Indian planters depended, were already being questioned at the bar of public opinion when the thirteen colonies obtained their independence. In due time, both were abolished, and the West Indies thus received a blow from which they are only slowly recovering. A similar economical

change deprived Canada of its preferential position in the wheat and timber trade; but Canada, by that time, no longer depended on the British market. Its advance had been steady from the beginning. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick contained many English settlers at the epoch of American Independence. Thousands of loyalists from the United States settled at that time in the Eastern Townships on the St. Lawrence, and on the northern shores of Lake Ontario. Upper Canada, as the latter district was afterwards named, was soon resorted to by emigrants from the British Isles; and this province alone now contains as many British colonists as the United States contained when they declared themselves independent a century ago. Thus did the very collapse of the old British Colonial Empire instantly scatter the seeds of a new one, which arose on the adjoining soil, and divided with the old one the dominion of the New World of the West. But it arose here in changed and disadvantageous circumstances: and the best fruits of the new English colonisation must be sought elsewhere.

The same catastrophe produced a similar effect, though in another way, on the opposite side of the globe. Like Spain and Portugal, England had partly supplied her colonies with labour by transporting thither her convicted criminals. This outlet was henceforth closed, and it became necessary to find a site for a new penal settlement. The recent explorations of Cook suggested the eastern coast of Australia. Cook had named this coast New South Wales, and hither a shipment of convicted felons was despatched in 1787. The village of wattled huts, which was built to shelter them, received the name of Sydney, from the minister who had directed the



measure. Another convict colony was formed in Van Diemen's Land. New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land, after remaining thirty years purely convict settlements, became, like Upper Canada, the resort of British emigrants. They soon proved a more attractive field of emigration than any previously known. Protected by the British naval power, the emigrants spread and multiplied, and formed new settlements: and the Australian group of colonies now contains altogether more colonists than the thirteen American colonies contained when they declared themselves independent a century ago. The collapse of the old Colonial Empire thus had a secondary effect. It scattered the seeds of a second new Colonial Empire, in that second New World which Cook had surveyed on the opposite side of the globe, and which may be called the New World of the South.

While the Colonial Empire of Great Britain was thus growing anew from its ruins at these distant points, a third basis for colonial enterprise was thrown into British hands by the European convulsion which followed upon the French Revolution. This third basis was situated in the Old World. All the navies of Europe being on the side of France, Great Britain had to strengthen the chain of her naval positions, in order to secure her distant possessions and her foreign trade. The Cape of Good Hope was the key of the maritime route to the East. It was in the hands of the Dutch East India Company, and had, in the course of a hundred and fifty years, become a considerable agricultural colony. The Dutch Republic, with its dependencies, was absorbed by France, and it became important that the Cape should be occupied by the English. It was retained after the Peace of 1814, and in

time the settlement was extended. Emigrants from England settled a new province to the eastward. The abolition of slavery in the British dominions had here a singular result. Deprived of their Hottentot slaves, many of the Dutch, though they had legally become British subjects, abjured the British rule, and wandered forth northwards and eastwards. Thus arose the settlements in the western parts of the colony of Natal, and the so-called Free-States of the Orange River and the Transvaal. A few years thus saw the beginning of a third branch of the new British Colonial Empire in Africa, a quarter of the globe where Great Britain had hitherto possessed nothing but some unhealthy stations on the west coast, principally used for collecting and shipping negro captives to the West Indies.

Canada, Australia, and the Cape thus formed the three main branches of the new British Colonial Empire. In all its parts the foundation on which it ultimately rested was the naval power of Great Britain. This has been explained with reference to Canada and the Cape; and undoubtedly the French, who had closely followed the English in exploring the Australian seas, and who have always been looking out for new colonial positions, would have attacked Australia, but for the protection of the fleet. Several naval and commercial stations were soon added to the new empire. Like Venice, England had from early times held naval stations beyond the seas. Formerly the "Narrow Sea," or English Channel, was the principal field of English commerce. France was our most dangerous enemy, and the command of the "Narrow Sea" against the French was always thought to be secured by England's holding Calais. Calais, how-

ever, was lost, without any loss to England's control over the seas which washed her shores: the truth being that the Narrow Sea was sufficiently commanded by the ports of England. But as English trade extended to the Mediterranean it became necessary to have, in this more distant sea, some port for the use of English vessels. Tangier was taken for this purpose in the time of Charles II., and a better station, both for commercial and naval purposes, was afterwards acquired in the Spanish peninsula of Gibraltar. Minorca was taken at the same time, but was restored in 1783. Two-thirds of the way across the Atlantic, England had found a halting-place for her ships employed in the American trade. What Gibraltar was to the trade of the Levant, Bermuda had become to the trade of America; and when Great Britain in 1783 stood forth in the world denuded of her principal colonies, in addition to the West Indies and Canada, she still possessed in Gibraltar and Bermuda two naval stations commanding the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Politically, these stations were dependencies of the British Crown, like the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands, and the trading stations on the West Coast of Africa; and, together with Canada and the West Indies, they constituted the Colonial Empire of Great Britain after independence had been secured to the thirteen colonies of the American Continent by the Peace of 1783.

The gradual acquisition of India and of the China trade by the East India Company increased the importance of the command of the Mediterranean Sea, the Eastern Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean. When all the navies of Europe were arrayed against that of Great

Britain in the wars which succeeded the French Revolution, it became important to add to her naval stations in the Mediterranean; and at the Peace of 1814 she retained the famous fortress of Malta, and the Ionian Islands, since ceded to the new kingdom of Greece. In the same period, as has been already mentioned, she acquired the Cape of Good Hope; and shortly afterwards she took possession of the desert island of Ascension. She made at the same time some substantial conquests from the hostile powers. In the West Indies she took Trinidad and the best part of Dutch Guiana; in the East the important settlements of Mauritius, Ceylon, and Malacca, thus making the beginning of a group of Eastern Dependencies outside the great Dependency of India, then in the hands of the East India Company. At the close of the great war in 1814, thirty years after the ruin of the old Colonial Empire, the outline of the present extensive system of British Colonies and Dependencies was complete; and during the three-quarters of a century which have since elapsed this outline has been extended and filled up, but not materially altered.

Since 1814 Great Britain has engaged in no struggle with other nations which has endangered her command of the seas; and during this long peace a steady growth in wealth and population has taken place in her colonies. The West Indies form an exception. Free trade in sugar, and the abolition of slavery, have deprived these colonies of their former cause of progress. They now occupy a comparatively humble position in the Empire; and their governments have, in most cases, undergone a change necessary for adapting them to their altered condition. The rest of the colonies fall into four groups:—(1) The

Canadiap; (2) the Australian; (3) the South African; (4) the Eastern Dependencies, which may include those scattered possessions which extend from Gibraltar in the west to Hong-Kong in the east, and have the Indian Empire for their centre. To this group, as has already appeared, the South African colonies belong by their historical origin.

The growth of Canada from an insignificant settlement of about 60,000 French peasants scattered on the banks of the St. Lawrence River to a Confederation of States with a population of 4,000,000, and having a large foreign commerce, is due to the same causes which have increased the 2,000,000 of the thirteen colonies in 1776 to 50,000,000 in 1881. The Aryan race has always moved steadily westwards. The temperate latitudes of Northern America are the natural emigration-field of Northern Europe, and a steady influx of emigrants from one to the other has continued during the century. The same motive which induced the Loyalists of 1783 to quit the United States has induced many British emigrants to prefer settling where they retain their nationality. That section of English America which adheres to the mother-country, though less favoured in soil and climate, has for this reason been able to compete as a field of emigration with that which has abandoned the mother-country; and the improvement of the means of travelling has now made it easy for the emigrant to reach Manitoba, a district in the heart of the Continent, containing about a hundred million acres of fine corn-growing land, equal in value to any in the United States. But to the unsentimental settler the latter undeniably offer greater attractions. Fifty thousand immigrants per month, most of whom

come from the United Kingdom, land in the United States; and many who emigrate to Canada speedily cross the frontier. The French of Quebec Province steadily emigrate to the States instead of moving west in the Dominion, and the frontier of Canada is a sieve, through which its capital and labour, by a natural law, are perpetually passing to a more profitable field.

To retain the loyalty of Canada to the British Crown, and to enable it to compete with the United States as a field of emigration, it was thought proper to give it some semblance of free government. Up to 1774 it had been governed as a conquered province. From 1774 to 1791 it was governed by a Governor and Council, under the name of the Province of Quebec; but in the latter year Mr. Pitt passed the Canada Act (31 George III., cap. 31), by which the colony was separated into two provinces, called Upper Canada and Lower Canada, the Ottawa River being the boundary. Each had its own Governor, and two legislative bodies, a Legislative Council of nominees, and an elected House of Assembly. Each Governor had his own Executive Council, and neither Governor nor Executive Council were responsible to the legislative bodies. The Canadians were thus cajoled with the same empty show of representative institutions which exists at this day in Germany. The Councils and Assemblies could indeed vote new laws, but their acts might be vetoed by an irresponsible Executive. The Councils and Assemblies voted supplies, but the Executive administered them. No member of the Executive could be deprived of his post by the Council and Assembly; and however corrupt and unpopular the entire government might be, it was removable only by the British Govern-

ment, which acted through the Colonial Office. The Colonial Office was presided over by an English Secretary of State, who owed his position to the chances of party politics, and was sometimes ignorant of the very names of the colonies whose fortunes were placed in his hands. A system better adapted to degrade and irritate a growing community could not have been devised. Yet this system existed in the Canadas for half a century; and it would probably have existed to this day had not the Canadians risen against it in arms.

When Queen Victoria came to the throne in 1837 *Te Deums* were sung in honour of the event in the churches on the St. Lawrence. The congregations quitted their seats and walked out. Before the end of the year several bodies of insurgents were in arms in different parts of the province. The discontents of Lower Canada had reached the point of outbreak. The Assembly had forwarded to England the grievances of the colony embodied in the "Ninety-two Resolutions;" and the British Parliament had replied by suspending the Canada Act, and placing the province under military rule. The situation was the same as the situation had been in New England sixty years before, when Parliament suspended the charter of Massachusetts. The condition of Upper Canada was little better. The government had fallen into the hands of an official clique, who styled themselves the British party. The great majority of the people were designated Rebels, and were believed in Great Britain to be anxious to shake off the British connexion, and to annex Canada to the United States. Upper Canada, though not in actual rebellion, was ripe for it. The outbreak in Lower Canada was suppressed. But

so little interest was then taken in Canada or its affairs, that the very fact of the rebellion was generally unknown, until in 1839 there arrived in Liverpool, on their way to Van Diemen's Land, twelve Canadians under sentences of transportation for treason. English people were startled, and some indignant sympathisers sued out writs of *habeas corpus*: and ultimately the prisoners were released. This incident caused inquiry; and inquiry dispelled a cloud of ignorance. At length, by force of public opinion, the situation was realised by British statesmen, and the true remedy was applied. In 1840 the Union Act (3 and 4 Victoria, chap. 35) was passed. By this Act the two Canadas were reunited into one province, under a single Governor and Executive Council, with a double legislature, consisting of a Legislative Council, nominated for life, and a House of Assembly, elected for four years. The Executive Council was chosen by the Governor; but it was henceforth practically subordinated to the legislative bodies. Members of the Executive Council vacated their seats on appointment, and could not act as Councillors unless re-elected, and the Executive Council continued in office only so long as its acts were approved by a majority in each of the legislative bodies. The subordination of the Executive to the Legislature, as in the mother-country, which was thus secured, received the name of "Responsible Government." It was the emancipation of the colony, and rendered it practically as free as one of the United States. It was also the emancipation of the Empire, for when secured in one of the colonies it was within the reach of all. This change is the principal event in our modern colonial history. Henceforth it was recognised



that the inhabitants of all colonies where Englishmen are the majority were entitled to the same political rights as Englishmen at home.

Soon after Responsible Government had been granted to Canada it was granted to the Australias. The Australians, like the Canadians, had long chafed under the misgovernment of the Colonial Office: and, strange as it seems, many Australians are now living who once denounced the tyranny and oppression of the mother-country, and loudly clamoured for separation. But their voices rarely reached England, where most people still thought of Australia as a vast desert, remarkable only for containing a den of thieves and murderers called "Botany Bay." As in Canada, this dense ignorance on the part of Englishmen was the root of the mischief. Sixty years had seen vast changes in the New World of the South. In 1821 it was thrown open to free emigration; and, as in Canada, considerable numbers of emigrants from the British Isles settled in New South Wales. Besides this, numbers of the convicts had become free men, or, in the colonial phrase, "emancipists." A great discovery had been made: it was found that the Highlands of New South Wales were the best sheep-walks in the world. Wool of excellent quality was shipped in increasing quantities to the manufacturers of England, and the flockmasters of Australia became rich men. As the colony prospered the work of exploration had been continued, and new settlements had been formed on the coasts. The settlement of the Swan River, now Western Australia, was begun in 1829. The colony of South Australia, an independent settlement from the first, was founded by emigrants from England in 1836. Port

Phillip, which has since become the colony of Victoria, was settled in 1837. The first permanent settlement in the North Island of New Zealand was made by a party from home in 1839, and in the following year the British occupation was extended to South Island. In 1841 New Zealand was separated from New South Wales, and made an independent colony, with Auckland for its capital. Port Phillip continued to form part of New South Wales.

Until 1842, that is to say, for a period of half a century, New South Wales had been governed as Canada had been governed before the Act of 1791, that is to say, despotically by its governors. It then received a mock constitution, something like that which Canada had received half a century before. By the New South Wales Act, 1842 (5 and 6 Victoria, chap. 76), a Legislative Council was established, consisting of 36 members, 12 of whom were to be nominated by the Crown and 24 to be elected by the colonists. This Legislative Council had no control over the Governor or the Executive Council. Melbourne, the new settlement on Port Phillip, was to send a single member to Sydney. The colonists of Melbourne, to show what value they set upon the New South Wales Act, unanimously elected as their representative Earl Grey, the British Colonial Secretary.

During the forties, the Australian colonists, especially those of New South Wales, steadily maintained the outcry for the control of their own affairs. More effectual than their clamours was the gradual infiltration of facts into the English mind. When a true notion of Australia dawned on English politicians, it became impossible to maintain such an absurdity as the govern-

ment of growing settlements so widely scattered being centred at Sydney. South Australia was already growing in importance as a separate colony, and the separation of New South Wales from its offshoots, and a full measure of political independence granted to each at the same time, placed all the Australian communities on a level with South Australia. By the Australian Colonies Act, 1850 (12 and 14 Victoria, chap. 59), Port Phillip and Van Diemen's Land were separated from New South Wales and erected into separate colonies. Provision was also made for detaching from New South Wales that portion of the colony which lay north of the thirtieth degree of latitude, and erecting this part into a separate colony, to which provision effect was given in 1859, when this part became the colony of Queensland. Legislative Councils were authorised for each of the new provinces, as well as for South Australia, and the four colonies were empowered to draw up their own constitutions. In 1855 the new constitutions received the royal assent. Each of the colonies provided itself with a double legislature, consisting of a Legislative Council and a House of Assembly, but the exact form differed in each colony. New South Wales adopted a Legislative Council, consisting of 31 members, appointed for life by the Governor, and a House of Assembly, consisting of 72 members. At first this body was elected for five years, but its duration is now limited to three. Manhood suffrage was adopted in 1858. Victoria adopted a similar constitution, with the difference that the Legislative Councillors retire by rotation. The Legislative Council of Victoria has since been made elective, instead of consisting of nominees. Tasmania and South Australia have followed the example

of Victoria in this respect, and the same precedent ultimately was followed by the Cape Colony.

The discovery of gold, which has so greatly advanced the fortunes of Australia, dates from the period of independence. Gold was first found in New South Wales : in 1851 the richest gold-field in the world, that of Ballarat in Victoria, was opened. It speedily became the rival of the gold-fields of California. Since that date Australia has exported about 365 millions sterling in gold to the rest of the world, after retaining about 35 millions for her own use, making a total of about 400 millions produced. This supply is still going on at a steady rate, and there is no prospect of its being diminished, for Victoria alone contains 20 million acres of auriferous soil, of which not one million have as yet been explored. The discovery of gold gave a great impulse to trade, and the growth of Melbourne in half a century into a city of a quarter of a million of inhabitants is a fact only paralleled by the growth of San Francisco. Other mining industries were developed; wheat was grown for export, and the vine successfully cultivated, especially in South Australia. Thus, in less than a century, has the miserable convict settlement of Sydney developed into a group of thriving independent colonies, each of which is rapidly growing into a nation.

The next colony which obtained Responsible Government was the Cape Colony. So long as the only route for ships to India was round the Cape it was thought necessary to maintain this as a Crown Colony, garrisoned by British forces. The government of the colony was as unsatisfactory to the colonists as in Canada and Australia. Crown councils, executive and legislative,

had been established in 1835, previous to which the Cape had been treated merely as a military post, and ruled by a military governor. The settlers petitioned for representative government in 1841, but their claims were neglected: and so little attention was paid to their wishes that the Home Government, when the Australians refused to take any more convicts, determined to make the Cape a penal settlement, and in 1849 despatched a shipload of convicts to Cape Town. The colonists, who were resolved to make a stand, rose in arms and refused to allow them to be landed. This incident forced their claims on public attention; and in the next year (1850) the Governor was empowered to summon a "constituent council" for the purpose of settling a more acceptable form of government. This body framed a constitution of the usual form, providing a double legislature, consisting of a Legislative Council and a House of Assembly, both of which were to be elected by the people. The Governor and Executive Council, however, still remained irresponsible to the legislature, just as in the Canadas up to 1840, and in New South Wales up to 1850; and no change occurred until the Cape Colony undertook its own defences, after the Suez Canal was opened in 1870. This undertaking on the part of the colony removed the chief pretext which remained for keeping the Cape Government under control; and in 1872 the Cape passed into the list of colonies possessing Responsible Government. Responsible Government has been recently proposed by the British Government to the colonists of Natal, the only part of British South Africa which is outside the Cape Colony; but the great predominance of blacks in the population makes it impossible for the colonists to accept it.

Such is the story of the attainment of "Responsible Government" by the principal colonies. It amounted to the political emancipation of several millions of Englishmen residing in the dependencies behind the seas. The incidents which immediately occasioned it, in each colony, are of little importance; its deep fundamental cause was the enfranchisement of the English middle classes by the Reform Act of 1832. The emancipation of the negro, and the enfranchisement of the colonist, resulted naturally from the passing of that memorable measure. But curiously enough, in most of the West Indian colonies the emancipation of the negroes rendered necessary the disfranchisement of the colonists. The constitutions of these islands dated from their acquisition, and were of a representative character, though the governors and executive councils were not responsible to the legislatures. So long as the planters were the only class possessed of political rights representative government worked well enough, in spite of the great waste that resulted from every small island having its own representative bodies, government staff, and civil service. But when the negroes were enfranchised and became entitled to vote, they naturally returned to the legislatures persons of their own colour, and the legislatures came into collision with the governments. Besides, the burden of separate governments fell heavily on the now impoverished islands; and gradually they were induced to surrender their independent constitutions, and to accept new ones of the "Crown" model. The only West Indian colonies which retain their original representative governments are Barbados and the Bahamas.

- All the rest, including Jamaica, are now Crown colonies;

and the cost of government has been considerably reduced by forming the Windward Islands and the Leeward Islands into two separate governments-in-chief. The Governor of Barbados is governor-in-chief of the Windward group; the Leeward Islands have since 1871 formed a single federal colony, the seat of government being St. John in Antigua. In the case of the Bahamas and Barbados, which keep their original representative form of government, it must be remembered, that although the form of government is representative, the Governor and Executive Council are not responsible to the legislatures, and these colonies are therefore still practically as much under the control of the home government as colonies like British Guiana, Natal, and Western Australia, in which the legislative body is partly elective and partly nominated by the Crown.

Another constitutional change affecting one group of the colonies remains to be noticed. This is the union of the colonies in British North America into one Federal State. After the establishment of Responsible Government it was only natural that the separate British colonies in North America should imitate the United States by uniting themselves for common convenience and benefit. Nova Scotia led the way, and in 1867, by the "British North America Act," Canada (divided into the Provinces of Quebec and Ontario, formerly Lower and Upper Canada respectively), Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick were combined as a single "Dominion," with a Federal government on the American model. The Dominion Parliament was empowered to take in new provinces, and since that time Prince Edward's Island on the eastern coast, British Columbia with Vancouver's'

Island on the western, and Manitoba in the interior, have also been incorporated with the Dominion. The only North American colony which remains outside the Confederation is Newfoundland, which from its complete isolation has nothing to gain by joining the Dominion, and would lose by having to pay Federal taxation.

From the fact that confederation has never become a practical question in the Australias, though it has been often mooted, and that it has been ineffectually attempted to introduce it in South Africa, it would appear that its adoption in Canada arose from causes which are not felt elsewhere. The main uses of confederation are to unite the inhabitants of adjoining states of the same race for purposes of defence, to provide them with uniform accommodation in respect of railways, telegraphs, and post office, and to abolish restrictions on inter-colonial trade, and differences of civil and criminal law. The North American colonies felt these needs keenly, both from their relative position and from the neighbourhood of the United States where the advantages of confederation were enjoyed to the full. In the more scattered settlements of South Africa and of Australia these needs are scarcely felt; and many years will probably elapse before the principle of confederation is more widely extended.

Such are the principal incidents in the history of the new Colonial Empire of Great Britain. It has existed in its present outline, losing little and gaining little, ever since the wars of the French Revolution. The chief loss which it has suffered is the island of New Caledonia, which was discovered, named, and taken possession of by Cook. It was, however, never occupied; and in 1853



the French Government, with the assent of England, occupied it as a penal settlement. The Ionian Islands have been ceded to Greece; the Orange River and Transvaal territories, occupied by Dutch Boers who have renounced British allegiance, have each been annexed by one British Government and restored to practical independence by another. On the other hand, the empire has been increased by annexing to it the Fiji archipelago, of some importance to the defence of the Australian group on account of the harbour of Levuka, which might be made an effective naval station, and long partially settled by English adventurers. Further extensions are spoken of in the Australian group. It has long been thought that the south-eastern part of the great island of New Guinea, including the fine harbour of Port Moresby, should be added to the Empire, and the British flag has recently been hoisted there under the direction of the Government of Queensland. The Home Government will probably ratify this act. It must, however, be remembered that all the vacant tracts of colonisable territory in temperate climes, where the English race can settle and multiply, are now taken up; and the policy of England discourages any increase of territory in tropical countries already occupied by native races. New Guinea comes under the latter description, and there is much truth in the dictum of an eminent living statesman, that "England has already black subjects enough."

## CHAPTER •X.

### THE COLONIES AND THE EMPIRE.

WHEN the United States severed from Great Britain, the British Crown lost two millions of subjects of British descent. The remnant of the Colonial Empire contained about half a million of inhabitants, of whom not more than 50,000 can have been of British descent, the bulk being the French in Canada and the negroes in the West Indies. Now the new Colonial Empire contains nearly sixteen millions of inhabitants, of whom above eight millions, chiefly in Canada and the Australias, are of European descent. Omitting from consideration the balance (representing natives), it thus appears that Great Britain numbers four times as many true colonists as she lost a century ago. The two millions who became American citizens have in the course of a century, partly by natural increase and partly by immigration, multiplied into fifty millions. The same causes are steadily multiplying the eight millions of British colonists in Canada, the Australias, and the Cape: But Canada and the Australias are the most important, for Canada includes 60 per cent, Australia 36 per cent, and South Africa only 4 per cent of the total European population of the colonies.

The balance of the colonial population, over seven millions, consists of natives, among whom almost all races under the sun are represented. Among our fellow-subjects we have the primitive negro in Australia, the African negro in the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone, the Creole or Europeanised negro in the West Indies, the Chinese in the Eastern Dependencies, Australia, and British Columbia; the Cingalese in Ceylon, the Kaffir and the Hottentot in South Africa, the Malay and the Polynesians in the Eastern Dependencies, Mauritius, the Cape, Fiji, and New Zealand; the Arawak in Guiana, and the Red Indian in the Dominion. The bulk of this non-European population is in the Eastern Dependencies, South Africa, and the West Indies. In Canada and the Australias the remnant of the native races is very scanty. In Canada there are about 100,000 Red Indians, who live on their own reserves, chiefly subsisting by agriculture, partly on Government relief. In New Zealand there are about 40,000 Maories, also living on their own lands under Government protection. They have the franchise, and return four members to Parliament. But both in Canada and New Zealand the time cannot be far distant when the native races will become extinct. In Australia there remain a few thousands of the primitive inhabitants, incapable of civilisation, and rapidly disappearing. The natives of Tasmania have disappeared altogether.

It is otherwise in the Eastern Dependencies, Africa, and the West Indies. In all these places the native races thrive and increase by the side of European colonists; and as they form the main supply of labour, the prosperity of these Colonies very much depends upon them.

It is, therefore, the policy of this country to protect them, and secure to them, as far as is possible, the enjoyment of their own laws. Slavery, indeed, though almost universally tolerated elsewhere in the East, is not tolerated on British soil. Polygamy may be said to be gradually disappearing except in South Africa, and it is to be hoped that the time will come when both these curses of native life will have disappeared throughout the Empire. The non-European races in the colonies, where they form the majority, are mainly employed in agriculture, petty commerce, and domestic and commercial service. In the West Indies coloured men are found in the professional grade, and in the Eastern Dependencies many non-Europeans are merchants and landowners.

The consideration of the colonial populations leads us to inquire on what principle they exist as social organisations. Communities rank as "agricultural" or "manufacturing," according to the proportion of population engaged—on the one hand, in raising or gathering produce from the soil; and, on the other, in manufacturing produce into new shapes. Agriculture, the lever by which man has universally raised himself from savagery, still remains, and will ever remain, his main pursuit. At an early stage in social history a certain proportion of labour is detached from agriculture for purposes of manufacture; and as civilisation grows in intensity and complication, the proportion thus detached increases. But it is not until the production of manufactures greatly exceeds the needs and consuming powers of the producing community, and is carried on for export, that the community ranks as "manufacturing." The

most prosperous nations of Europe and Asia, and the United States of America, are alone in this sense "manufacturing" nations; the rest of the world, including the colonies, remains in the "agricultural" stage.

In classifying the colonies as agricultural communities we meet with a distinction which touches the beginnings of colonial history. The first colonies, formed when there was still abundance of land for an increasing population at home, were occupied in raising tropical produce for the markets of the mother-countries. To plant self-dependent communities, intended to subsist by domestic agriculture and trade, like the parent-countries, was an afterthought; and it is to the principle of independence which was thus, as it were, spun into the primitive staple of their frame, that the political independence of the United States and the British Responsible Government colonies is traceable. In the tropical colonies the labour of subject races is engaged in raising or gathering tropical produce. In the self-dependent off-shoots of Great Britain, which have grown up in climes comparatively temperate, colonists of European descent are engaged in personal labour, reproducing thereby the social face of things in the mother-country. Both classes of colonies are alike, in that they consist of agricultural communities who partly consume but more largely export the produce which they raise and collect.

But the idea of agriculture in any sense was itself an afterthought in the process which four centuries ago attracted European enterprise across the Atlantic. For many years men crossed the Atlantic solely in search of commodities which needed not to be produced, but only to be collected. For subsistence they depended partly

on stores which they carried out with them, and partly on produce raised by the natives. The first European colonists were seekers of the precious metals and stones, and of the tropical dyeing wood which was in the Middle Ages called "Brazil," and this primitive form of colonial adventure still exists. The British colonist still seeks gold in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and British Columbia. South Africa and Ceylon yield diamonds and other precious stones. A very varied class of other products comes within the same description. The pine-timber of Quebec, the cod-fish of Newfoundland, the oil nuts and condiments of Western Africa, the phosphates of Canada and the West Indies, the pimento and dyeing woods of Jamaica, the salt and turtles of the Bahamas, the mahogany of British Honduras, and the copper ores of Australia, are all instances of this "primitive" colonial produce which needs no cultivating, but only collecting.

But the mainstay of colonial prosperity is agricultural production. Colonies thrive in proportion as they raise some kind of agricultural produce for export. Sugar, which was the first crop cultivated for export in the American settlements, is now cultivated, not only in British Guiana and the West Indies, but in Mauritius, Natal, Queensland, and Fiji, and it is the principal produce of the British tropical colonies. The cultivation of the cane involves heavy labour, and the raw juice is not merchantable without undergoing some process of manufacture. In the best commercial conditions, such as exist in British Guiana, this process is carried to an advanced stage, so that little remains to be done by the refiner at home. Sugar planting thus requires a full

supply of labour, and the supply of labour is generally short of the supply of capital. Hence the planters largely depend on the immigration of native races. Coolies emigrate from India and China, under contracts for terms of years, to nearly all the sugar colonies. Queensland and Fiji depend to a great extent on immigration from the Pacific Islands. The West Indies must always depend on their negro population. In that climate the Indian and Chinese coolies cannot do the same amount of work, and their offspring degenerate. Coffee was once an important staple in the West Indies, but its production by English capital has latterly shifted to the eastern colonies, because labour is there cheaper, as well as more certain and abundant. \* Tobacco is not grown for export to any great extent in any British colony.

More important to the mother-country than sugar and coffee, which she can buy in foreign markets, are the raw materials for her manufactures; these she largely imports from her dependencies. The bulk of the cotton supply comes from the United States; but India, Queensland, and Fiji, supply a certain quantity. The bulk of the wool imported into England is grown in the Australias, New Zealand, and the Cape Colony. Though no colonial wool is equal in quality to the best kinds of English wool, the colonial article is not, on the whole, much inferior to the home-grown.

The self-dependent colonies also export to England a share of their food produce, in which respect they are coming more and more into competition with the United States. Both Canada and Australia send us wheat, as well as meat, live, dead, and preserved.\* Canada sends us cheese; Australia and South Africa send us wines.

The true measure of the value of the Colonies is their trade with the mother-country ; and the most important part of the Colonial trade is the export to the Colonies of British manufactures. In the last century it was well known to English politicians that the commercial importance of the American colonies was out of all proportion to their population. To her two millions of colonists Great Britain exported in 1776 ~~2~~<sup>2</sup>~~x~~ millions' worth of her goods, and her total exports being sixteen millions, this was in fact more than one-third of her trade with the world. In 1876, out of total exports amounting to two hundred millions, sixty-five millions' worth, or nearly a third, were sent to the British Dependencies : that is, the colonies and India take of English goods one-half as much as all her foreign customers together, including America. The contribution of the colonies to this proportion is fast increasing. The Australians in particular become every year of more and more importance as customers for British manufactures, particularly for England's great articles of export, woollen and cotton fabrics. Each Australian consumes £3, 4s.' worth of textile fabrics per annum, as against a home consumption of £2 per head. The colonists are steady customers for glass, earthenware, furniture, chemicals, machinery of all sorts, paper, books, and hardware. As the colonies extend, there is a great demand for certain articles which growing countries especially want, such as railway rails, locomotives, and carriages, telegraph wires, submarine cables, mining and other machinery, agricultural implements, mill work, horse carriages, carts and waggon, saddlery and harness. Of all these articles England is the chief producer, and the demand for them



in the colonies assists her in holding her ground in other markets. The colonial trade is preferred to the foreign, on account of its greater certainty and steadiness. Foreign trade is liable to sudden losses consequent upon increased production in foreign countries: but colonial trade resembles a local extension of the home market.

One more department of colonial export should be mentioned. England no longer exports dead agricultural produce to her colonies, but her climate and soil confer upon her the first position in the world for stock-breeding, and for her breeds of live stock all her colonies are customers. Cattle and sheep are largely bred for export, but the most profitable branch of this trade is breeding horses. The Clydesdale draught-horse, the chief work-horse of the world, is exported to Australia and New Zealand by thousands, and a still larger number goes to America.

The United Kingdom, India, and the Colonies constitute for practical purposes a single great state, which may be called the United Empire. This United Empire is open to all Englishmen for purposes of enterprise, by which is understood the transfer of labour and capital to new fields, and for purposes of trade. Both enterprise and trade follow the British flag, in preference to making foreign connections. Theoretically, indeed, Englishmen enjoy, as a rule, no preference in either respect before persons of other nationalities. Frenchmen, Germans, and Italians are equally at liberty to carry their capital and labour to the colonies, and to engage in their trade. But the fact that the colonies are English communities, that their life is an English life, and that it is Englishmen who have made them what they now are, both

attracts the Englishman to them and tends to keep them for the Englishman as a field of enterprise. The labourers and capitalists of England alike turn to a field where others have already been successful. Does labour become too abundant? It is sure of better wages in the colonies. Is capital earning a low interest at home? It will earn a higher one abroad, and the safest place for its employment is a community of English descent. The experience of three centuries shows that for England emigration is a necessity. England cannot produce food enough for more than about half of her present numbers, and at the present rate of their increase her food-bill to foreign countries increases at the rate of six millions sterling annually. It is only natural that the overplus of population should go to the source of the food-supply, and this is really the principle of emigration. During the last century America was the only emigration-field of England. At the beginning of that century labour was so cheap that white men still went as labourers to the West Indian Islands; but the foundation of Georgia and the increased prosperity of the Northern States, especially Pennsylvania, soon attracted labour to the continent. After the American war this emigration field was closed to those who wished to remain Englishmen; but during the stirring period which followed, the need of emigration was little felt, trade being greatly stimulated by the war with France, and the surplus population employed in the army and navy. After 1815, the need for emigration revived, and English emigrants went in great numbers to the North-Western States of America. English politicians therefore opened the Cape and Australia to emigration; and since 1820 a steady counter-

tide of emigration has set towards the New World of the South.

This movement of capital and labour from the mother-country to the colonies has its reaction. Capital is frequently realised in the colonies, and comes back to the mother-country for re-investment; and the interest which capital earns in the colonies is largely spent in the mother-country. For rich colonists naturally look back to England as the place in which to enjoy the fruits of their labours; and in not a few instances they also bring back with them the fruits of professional and political experience. Some valuable public men owe their training to the political life of the colonies. Thus neither the wealth nor the intellect and enterprise which this country furnishes to her offshoots are wholly lost to her; and her colonies may be regarded as "branches" in the commercial sense, to which her surplus capital circulates, and whose capital is ever tending to return to her.

It is manifestly to the interest of this country that its flood of surplus capital and labour should enrich British soil, instead of swelling the prosperity of the United States. But the laws of nature control its direction. If the English capitalist finds United States railways a better investment than the bonds of the New Zealand Government, it is absurd to assure the English labouring man that he will be better off in New Zealand than in the United States. Nor is the emigrant amenable to the argument that by going to the latter country he would be supporting the manufacturers of Middlesex and Lancashire instead of those of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. Against the competition of

the old Colonial Empire, which has a century's start in the race, the mother-country and the new Colonial Empire must struggle as best they may.

In the great industrial race against the United States, in which Great Britain and her dependencies are jointly engaged, we are in one respect heavily weighted. Free from the entanglements of European politics, the American federal republic has nothing to fear from foreign enemies. Vast but compact, isolated but possessing all resources within itself, it has no frontier which requires defence: and it would not be ruined, though its progress and prosperity might suffer a check, if all its ports were under perpetual blockade. The British Empire lies on the scattered fringe of many oceans: and its very existence depends on the maintenance of its ocean communication. The burden of securing and defending these, by arsenals, garrisons, and fleets, is a heavy one, and it is increasing.

As for the purposes of enterprise and trade England and her dependencies constitute a single great State, so also they are included in a general system of defence by land and sea. The two departments of national defence stand theoretically on the same footing. It is admitted, throughout the British Empire, that each of its main divisions ought to provide in money, men, and ships for its own defence by land as well as by sea. The United Kingdom is responsible for its own defences, and there is no obligation on India or the colonies to furnish men or money for their maintenance. India, and those colonies which have Responsible Government, are equally under an obligation to provide for their own naval and military defences. But the rest of the colonies are still

under the wing of Great Britain ; and Great Britain even theoretically has therefore the sole care of their defences.

The colonies contain only two inland frontiers which need be considered—1. The frontier between the United States and Canada; and 2. The South African frontier.

The Canada frontier is a weak one, being nowhere completely defensible, but from the situation of the American settlements there are only four places where it could be advantageously attacked. These are Detroit, Niagara, Montreal (*with* Rouse's Point), and Cornwall. At all these places it has to be secured, and the duty of doing so, and of keeping up the Canadian militia, devolves upon the Dominion Government. Canada has three quarters of a million of militia enrolled for service, and 150,000 ready for the field at short notice. Most of the South African frontier belongs to the Cape Colony, which is also responsible for its own defences. But its eastern portion, between Natal and Zululand, forms the frontier of a Crown colony, and this frontier Great Britain consequently has the duty of protecting. The existence of this frontier is one of the obstacles to South African confederation; for the colonists of the Cape will not undertake the burden of defending those of Natal from the warlike Zulus, from whom the Cape Colony has nothing to fear.

But India and the "Responsible Government" colonies, though theoretically expected to provide for their own defences generally, and actually undertaking the burden of their own military defence, form part of the area which is defended by the British fleet. The primary object of this is the protection of British trade and enterprise. But there are reasons for it which lie deeper,

and are in fact involved in the principle of our national existence. The fleet is England's right arm. But for her fleet, England would be a cipher in the councils of Europe, might be denuded of her colonies, and could not hold the Indian Empire a year. But for the fleet, the English working man might any day find his daily occupation gone, and the price of his children's bread risen to half-a-crown a loaf. The greater the fleet, and the wider the area of its operation, the more effective this mighty right arm of the nation must become. Every shilling that is devoted to it, if expended with economy and judgment, is well bestowed, for it is England's insurance against those great accidental calamities which destroy the happiness and prosperity, and sometimes the lives, of nations. Now, the fleet, which has gradually won most of our colonies from other hands, and under the protection of which the Empire has grown to its present extent and prosperity, is also the visible bond which secures the union of the parts of the Empire into one great whole.

In the British Empire there are five main lines or roads of maritime communication:—1. The road to Canada. 2. The road to the West Indies and British Guiana. 3. The road to India, Ceylon, China, the Australias, and the Pacific, by way of the Suez Canal. 4. The road to India, Ceylon, China, the Australias, and the Pacific, round the Cape of Good Hope. 5. The road to the Australias, the Pacific, British Columbia, and Vancouver's Island, round Cape Horn. These five main lines of colonial trade and of imperial communication have to be kept open and secured by means of a series of naval stations. The whole world is interested in

this, for with only two additions, the route from the West Indies to the Brazils, and the Plate river, and the route from China across the Pacific to the Sandwich Islands and San Francisco, both of which are longitudinal extensions of the British lines, they compose the whole system of the world's maritime highways, and they therefore practically place Great Britain in charge of the trade of the globe.

*1st Line* (to Canada).—On this line there is but one station, Halifax, Nova Scotia. Though the shortest, this is not the least important of our imperial roads; and at Halifax we have a large and important dockyard.

*2d Line* (to the West Indies).—On this line there are the four naval positions of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Antigua. The dockyard of Bermuda is the second great dockyard of the British Empire in the Atlantic. The importance of the West Indian stations has in one respect diminished. The old monopoly days, when the quarrels of France and England were fought out by their fleets in the West Indies, are past. But the United States, our great commercial rival, have in the course of a century become more formidable than France: and this fact has given the West Indian Stations new importance. These stations cut the American seaboard in two. A strong squadron that held them must command the mouth of the Mississippi, the great central highway of the States, and the strength of the British position here compensates for the weakness of the land frontier in Canada.

*3d Line* (Suez Canal, thence east and south).—On this line there are seven naval stations—Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Bombay, Cape Comorin and Trincomalee in Cey-

lon, Singapore, Hong-Kong, and King George's Sound in Western Australia. Cyprus, between Malta and Aden, was acquired in 1878, but has not yet been utilised. The situation of these naval stations illustrates the connection between colonial extension and the means of securing the safety of general British commerce. Aden was acquired by India, and Gibraltar, Malta, and Hong-Kong have become colonies, on account of their importance as naval stations; the facilities which Ceylon and the Straits Settlements afford for the protection of the route to Madras, Calcutta, and China, weighed with the English Government in acquiring them. Cape Comorin and Trincomalee are the key of the further East. Singapore is a great naval and commercial station in one.

*4th Line* (Cape, thence east and south).—On this line there are six important naval stations, the last (King George's Sound) being common to this and the last-mentioned line. They are Sierra Leone, Ascension, St. Helena, Simon's Bay in the Cape Colony, Mauritius, and King George's Sound. Here again we have two Crown colonies which are employed solely as naval stations—Ascension and St. Helena.

These two lines, both leading east and south, the one through the Suez Canal, the other round the Cape, are of all the most important, and rank first among the highways of the globe. Jointly they form the communications between Great Britain and the whole of her dependencies except Canada and the West Indies. If any thing were necessary to increase their security it would be the manifest duty of the Imperial Government to do it. Some authorities think the absolute acquisition



by England of the port of Suez necessary to make the former route perfectly secure; and its security would certainly be menaced if any other naval power should ever hold the head of the Persian Gulf.

*3th Line* (Cape Horn, the Pacific, and the 'Australias).—On this enormous line the two first stations, Sierra Leone and Ascension, are identical with the two first stations on the last-mentioned line. The rest are the Falklands, Sydney, and Fiji. The fine harbour of Levuka, on the Island of Ovalau, is a naval station of great value, and might, if necessary, be made the Malta of the Pacific.

Though the general system of defence, on which the security of these routes depends, is sufficient in its outlines, it is well known that in case of war with any great maritime power much would have to be done in order to make it completely available. To enable our iron-clads to operate with effect, the number of first-class naval stations, each having an impregnable arsenal and dockyard, requires to be increased. India needs one at Bombay or Trincomalee, and Australia one at Sydney. Besides these, we need a number of naval outposts capable of holding considerable supplies of all requisites for a naval force, especially coal, and sufficiently strong to defy an enemy's cruisers. These require to be organised on a uniform plan, and to be garrisoned by sufficient forces trained specially to this branch of service. A very large expenditure would be necessary for all this, and the colonies and India ought to contribute a quota to it. For the maintenance of our Empire is not the interest of England alone. The suspension of our commerce with the colonies would be a far greater disaster

to them than to England, inasmuch as while England possesses other markets for her manufactures, they have practically no other market than the mother-country for their produce; and to this fact colonial opinion is fully awake. If the colonies were invited to defray half the cost of maintaining the men-of-war on the colonial stations, they would in all probability cheerfully accept the burden; and would also probably bear a share in the cost of maintaining and garrisoning the imperial arsenals and coaling-stations.

From the point of view of the British taxpayer the money relations between the mother-country and the colonies must appear to be one-sided. In return for the protection of the fleet, the colonies contribute nothing directly to the treasury of the mother-country, and they are permitted to lay heavy import duties upon her manufactures. If the balance were properly adjusted, the colonies even now ought to pay to the imperial treasury subventions to the amount of three or four millions a year, and ought to impose only a low *ad valorem* duty, say of 10 per cent, on English manufactures, instead of 25 per cent as in Canada. If the defences of the Empire were placed on a war footing, their share would be greater. It should, however, be remembered that the burden of colonial defence, in times quite recent, fell much more heavily on the mother-country. Thirty years ago the mother-country spent four millions sterling a year in providing soldiers for the defence of the colonies. There were British garrisons not only at the Cape, but in Australia, New Zealand, and the North American provinces. After the grant of Responsible Government these garrisons were

withdrawn, and their place was taken mainly by volunteer regiments raised among the colonists. The military expenditure of the mother-country in the colonies is now less than half of what it was thirty years ago, and, with the exception of the garrison of Halifax, Nova Scotia, it is exclusively confined to the Crown colonies.

The colonial empire thus forms a great organisation, covering with its network half the sphere, from British Columbia to Fiji, and enabling British enterprise (transfer of labour and capital), and commerce to circulate, under guard of the fleet, from Britain to permanent possessions and offshoots on every shore of the ocean. It is constructed, as we have seen, on the main natural highways of the world; and hence it grows naturally with the growth of general trade and enterprise. The progress of Mauritius and the Cape Colony, for instance, is intimately connected with the increase of trade to India and Australia; that of Ceylon and the Straits Settlements with the trade of China and Japan; and that of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia with the trade to America. A fresh illustration of this result of the advantageous position of the colonies will probably appear, when the Panama Canal is made, in a great commercial development of the West Indies.

The vital essence of this great organisation lies rather in common descent, speech, and traditions, in unity of social and commercial interests, and in common citizenship of the empire, than in its actual political arrangements. The example of the United States proves how strong is the tie of filiation, even after the tie of common citizenship is gone. Where the latter tie continues, the strength of all other ties is multiplied; and its binding

force is increased in proportion to its apparent slightness. For, by the relaxation of the control exercised by the mother-country over the colonies, their connection with her has, in fact, been consolidated. The machinery of the Colonial Office, in the case of the Responsible Government colonies, how does little more than ensure a regular system of communication between the colonial governor and the home ministry. Over the crown colonies the mother-country exercises a control of a different kind. It controls their constitutions, legislation, and administration; defends them, and conducts their wars, and exercises that patronage which in Responsible Government colonies is vested in the ministry; and this business is transacted through the Colonial Office.

The transaction of the financial and commercial business of the colonial governments in England is entrusted to officers termed "Agents." As the business of most of the colonies is but small, a Government department called the Department of the "Crown Agents for the Colonies," is maintained by the English Government for facilitating its despatch. There are two Crown Agents, who act generally for all the colonies, except Canada, New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, and New Zealand, and they also transact loan business for British Columbia and New Zealand. Attached to the Crown Agents' office is a staff of officials whose business it is to supervise the plans and contracts for railway, harbour, and telegraph works. The colonies which do not employ the "Crown Agents" maintain agents of their own, who are styled "Agents-General." The Canadians, who have a transatlantic love of big words, have lately styled their representative in England

"High Commissioner." Some colonies employ separate agents for facilitating emigration.

For the purpose of rewarding those who have held office and rendered distinguished service to the Crown, either in the colonies or in connection with colonial administration, a special order of knighthood, called the Order of St. Michael and St. George, was established in 1845. It derives its title from the patron saints of Malta and the Ionian Islands, for the benefit of which colonies it was originally established; but it is now extended to all the colonies. In rare instances colonists have been admitted to the lower social dignities of the mother-country. It would, perhaps, be well if such honours were dispensed more liberally. That degree of social, public, or professional eminence, which, when combined with a certain amount of wealth, is held to entitle a man to positive distinction of rank, is not to be found in the mother-country alone; and there seems no reason why eminent men from the colonies should not be elevated for life to the peerage of the United Kingdom, in which case they might, as members of the House of Lords, effect that representation of the colonies in Parliament which it seems undesirable to effect in the House of Commons.

The political position of the colonies, as members of the Empire, is found unsatisfactory by some colonial critics, who wish to see them more closely incorporated with the old country; and as they grow in population and wealth, it will probably be more and more called in question. Englishmen are for the most part contented with the colonial system as it is. The time was when not a few among us contemplated the disintegration

of the Empire as an event neither unlikely nor undesirable. When considerable sums were annually charged in the British estimates for the defence of the colonies, nothing was commoner than the cry, "Of what use are our colonies to us?" Some intelligent politicians, seeing that the principal colonies were determined on having self-government, thought that they were on the highroad to complete emancipation, and pronounced it to be the true policy of the mother-country to accelerate their separation from it, regarding such a separation as an event which in the natural course of things must come sooner or later. Canada, they argued, would naturally join the federation of the United States, while the colonies of the Australian group, and of South Africa, would unite in separate federations of their own.

But forty years in Canada, and thirty years in Australia, of Responsible Government have proved this view to be founded on a misconception. Nothing is farther from the desires of those colonies, whose autonomy has been permanently secured to them, than separation from the British Crown and Empire. On the contrary, they desire before all other things some closer system of connection with the mother-country. But it is not certain that any closer political connection is desirable for the mother-country, or indeed feasible at all. Nature has separated the colonies from the mother-country by thousands of miles of ocean. The requirements of the colonies must always differ greatly from those of the mother-country and of each other. Hence their laws can never be assimilated, and for the same reason, differences must always exist in the methods of their administration. The mother-country and the several colonies must therefore

continue, for legislative and administrative purposes, to be separate communities ; and each must solve its own social and political problems in its own way. And the unity of the Empire, which few Englishmen, either at home or in the colonies, now wish to see impaired, would probably be in no way strengthened, if representatives of all the colonies sat for the discussion of Colonial affairs in an Imperial Parliament.

## CHAPTER XI.

### COLONIAL GOVERNMENT.

FROM the preceding chapters it appears that the British colonies are divisible into two distinct classes:-- (1) Those which have obtained Responsible Government ; and (2) those which are governed by governors and councils not responsible to the colonists, and practically under the control of the Home Government. These are all roughly described as Crown Colonies. The former class includes the two principal colonial groups, the North American and the Australian, and the Cape Colony, the chief member of the South African group. In the class which are governed from home are included the West Indies, the Eastern Dependencies, and the remainder of the African settlements. Even in respect of total population, the former class is the most important, having a population of eight and a half millions against seven millions in the colonies which are governed from home. The colonies of the former class are situated mainly in the temperate zone, while those which are governed from home are mainly in the torrid zone. As a result of this, we find a great difference in the population of the two groups. With the exception of the Cape Colony, Queensland, and New Zealand, the colonies which possess Responsible



Governments are almost entirely peopled by white men. In the Cape Colony the natives and Malays number over half a million; in Queensland there are about 5000 coolies and Chinese, and in New Zealand there are still left about 40,000 natives. But all these put together make considerably less than three-quarters of a million, out of a total of eight and a half millions; and if the Cape Colony be excepted, the percentage of the native or non-European element in the Responsible Government colonies is so small that it may be practically disregarded. But in the Crown governments, with a population of seven millions, there are only about 175,000 Europeans, or  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of the whole. The residue, or  $97\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, are people of non-European origin. In the West Indies, including Guiana and British Honduras, the English population is 5 per cent of the whole, the bulk of the inhabitants being negroes. In Ceylon, with a native population of nearly three millions, there are only 20,000 Europeans, or less than 1 per cent.

We thus find the colonies sharply divided into two classes. In one the European element largely predominates. In the other, the non-European element largely predominates. This fact reveals the principle on which colonies are entrusted with Responsible Government. With the exception of the Cape Colony, it has only been granted where the British population are an overwhelming majority. Wherever the majority are of another race, whether negroes, Asiatics, or Polynesians, it follows that they cannot be entrusted with the government. Their votes would be at the disposal of chieftains or intriguers of their own race, and they would overpower the whites. Nor can the government be entrusted to

the European minority, who are mainly employers of labour, forming numerically a very small class, and relying on the Home Government for protection and assistance. These colonies are in circumstances analogous to those of India; and, as in India, the government must, as a rule, be a government of British officials, assisted in the legislative councils by nominees selected from the best class of residents.

But all the colonial governments are in one respect alike. Each and every one of them has the Sovereign of Great Britain for its head. The Sovereign acts in this, as in other matters of State, through the Government, which is responsible to the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The share of the Crown in the government of the colonies therefore really belongs to Parliament, and is exercised by the Government for the time being. In deciding matters of primary importance the whole Cabinet have a share, their decision being liable to be reversed by an adverse vote of Parliament. Matters of secondary importance are decided by the Secretary of State for the colonies. But the British Government practically has no great share in directing the affairs of colonies which have obtained Responsible Government. Its chief business is to nominate a Governor to act as the local representative of the Crown. In the only case where Responsible colonies have been confederated, the Canadian Dominion, the Home Government, instead of nominating the governor of each colony, nominates a Governor-General for the Dominion, who nominates the lieutenant-governors of the several provinces. For each of the Australian colonies, and for the Cape Colony, the Home Government nominates a special governor.

Colonial Governors constitute an important class of British politicians. On their tact and judgment depends in a great measure the preservation of harmonious relations between the mother-country and the colonies. They are not selected from the officials of the Colonial Office, but from among the more distinguished members of both Houses of Parliament, and of the military, naval, and diplomatic services. In some instances they are gentlemen who have creditably filled subordinate positions in colonial administrations. Governors are appointed by letters-patent under the Great Seal, and they hold office during the pleasure of the Crown; but it is understood that their tenure of office shall not as a rule extend beyond a period of six years from the assumption of their duties. Though the governor is the Crown's vicergerent in the colony, he does not possess general sovereign power, his authority being limited by his commission, by the laws of the colony, and by the general regulations of the Home Government; and he is liable, like any other subject, to be sued in the courts of the colony. Though usually invested with the title of captain-general or commander-in-chief, he has not the actual command of the forces, unless specially commissioned in that behalf; and although it is his duty to repel aggression and to repress piracy, he has not the power of declaring war against any foreign state, or against the subjects of any foreign state. As the head of the civil government, he issues writs for the election of representative assemblies and councils, convokes and prorogues the legislative bodies, and dissolves, when such a measure is proper, those which are subject to dissolution. He withholds, or grants, as the case may be, his assent to bills passed

by the legislative bodies ; this power, however, is limited by his instructions, which direct him to reserve certain bills, usually such as deal with the currency, the army and navy, differential duties, the effect of foreign treaties, and matters affecting the mother-country, for the actual assent of the Crown at home, or to assent to such bills only with a clause suspending their operation until they have been confirmed at home. He issues warrants for the expenditure of the public moneys ; grants pardons, respites, and remissions of fines and penalties, and appoints and suspends public officers. It is his duty to send regularly to the Home Government the "Annual Blue Book" of each colony, which contains returns of the colonial revenue and expenditure, and also copies of all the laws which have been passed by the colonial legislature.

The business of the Executive Council, which exists in all colonies except the military post of Gibraltar, is to assist the governor by its advice. This function, however, in colonies having Responsible Government, amounts to directing the government of the colony generally, and is thus exactly analogous to that of the Cabinet at home. In such colonies, the Council (excepting *ex-officio* members) is practically nominated by the majority in the legislatures, and therefore when the Council no longer retain the confidence of the legislatures they at once tender their resignation. In other colonies the power of the Councillors is limited in various degrees. In some Crown colonies it is held as constitutional doctrine that the governor can do no act without the concurrence of the Council ; but in practice the governor is sometimes obliged to act on his own judg-

ment, relying for his justification on the support of the Home Government. In such cases the Councillors usually record their opinion adverse to the governor's, for transmission home. If necessary the governor has the power of suspending them, but the Crown alone can dismiss them from their office.

The legislatures of the colonies, where they are representative, are analogous to the Parliaments of the United Kingdom. Laws are expressed to be made, following the English formula, by the governor on the Queen's behalf, with the advice and consent of the legislative bodies or body; and, as in England, they are designated "Acts." In Crown colonies they are called "Ordinances." The more important colonies, following the example of the mother-country, have a double legislature, consisting of a council and an assembly, in both of which bills must pass in order to become law; and the provincial legislatures of the Canadian colonies, with the exception of Ontario and British Columbia, which have each a small elected provincial assembly, have also this double character. Among the colonies which do not possess Responsible Government, the Bahamas, Barbados, and Bermuda have also a double legislature. In the rest of the non-responsible colonies there is a single legislative body. In British Guiana, the Leeward Islands, Malta, Natal, and Western Australia, this is partly elective and partly nominated by the Crown, and is therefore termed a "Composite Council." In the rest of the colonies the legislature is a "Crown Council," consisting wholly of officials and of non-official members nominated by the Crown.

To this it is necessary to add an account of the govern-

ment of each colony, in which the following order will be observed :—1. The Canadian Dominion and Provincial Governments, together with Newfoundland ; 2. The Governments of the Australian group, including the Crown Colonies of Fiji and Western Australia ; 3. The Cape Colony and the Crown Colony of Natal ; 4. The rest of the Crown Colonies, including the various settlements on the fringe of the Old World, together with the West Indies and the neighbouring British possessions on the continent of America.

The government of the Canadian Dominion is modelled upon the Federal government of the United States. Each of the seven provinces which compose the Dominion—Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Prince Edward's Island, and British Columbia—has its separate provincial legislature. The powers of these provincial legislatures are limited to local questions ; and all matters of general public policy are dealt with by the Parliament of Canada. These matters include the public debt and public property, the regulation of commerce, the raising of taxes and public loans, currency and banking, weights and measures, the postal service, the military and naval services, all matters connected with navigation, shipping, and fisheries, and with the Indian natives. Matters of law which can only be dealt with by the Canadian Parliament and not by the provincial legislatures, are the criminal law, bankruptcy and patent law, the law of marriage and divorce, of naturalisation, and of copyright.

The Parliament of Canada meets annually at Ottawa, upon summons issued by the Governor-General in the Queen's name. The Governor-General nominates the

Speaker of the Senate; the Speaker of the House of Commons is elected by the House. In order to assist the Governor-General in his duties, there is, exactly as in England, a council styled the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, the members of which are nominated by the Governor-General; but the real business of government is carried on by a Cabinet of fourteen ministers, who have the support of the majority in the House of Commons. The Prime Minister of the Dominion, who is called upon by the Governor-General to form an administration, and who forms it out of his political supporters, is the "Minister of the Interior." His duties, besides the general management of the government and miscellaneous duties which are not entrusted to any other minister, include those of the Home and Foreign Secretaries in England. Besides the Prime Minister, the Cabinet includes the Ministers of Finance, of Justice (the Attorney-General), of Public Works, of Inland Revenue, of Railways and Canals, of Agriculture, of Marine and Fisheries, of Customs, of Militia and Defence, the Postmaster-General, the Secretary of State, and the President of the Privy Council.

For provincial political business each province has its own executive and legislative bodies. Each has its lieutenant-governor, who is appointed by the Governor-General. He is assisted by an Executive Council or cabinet, enjoying the support of the majority in the Legislative Assembly. Except Manitoba, all the provinces have Legislative Assemblies; Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward's Island have also second chambers in the shape of Legislative Councils. Ontario and British Columbia have none.

The Legislative Assembly of Ontario consists of 88 members, from whom the Provincial Ministry or Legislative Council are selected. The Attorney-General, of the province ranks as the provincial premier; the rest of the provincial ministers are the Commissioners of Agriculture and Public Works, of Crown Lands, the Minister of Education, the Provincial Secretary and the Treasurer. Quebec has two provincial legislative bodies, the Council and the Assembly, both elective; the latter consisting of 65, the former of 24 members. The Executive Council is formed chiefly of the members of the Legislative Assembly, but members of the Legislative Council are also found in it. Besides the Attorney General, who ranks as Provincial Premier, the Provincial Cabinet consists of the Minister of Agriculture and Public Works, the Provincial Treasurer and Secretary, the Commissioner of Crown Lands, and the Minister of Railways.

The provincial constitutions of Nova Scotia, of New Brunswick, and of Prince Edward's Island, resemble those of Quebec in having a double chamber. Each has its Legislative Council and its Legislative Assembly. The Legislative Council of Nova Scotia differs from the others in being composed of the Governor's nominees. The Executive Council, however, is more democratic in its constitution, consisting of four official members, the Premier, the Provincial Secretary, the Attorney-General, and the Commissioner of Public Works and Mines, and of four unofficial members from among the Legislative Assembly, which consists of 38 members. In New Brunswick the Executive Council is mainly selected from the Legislative Assembly. The President of the



Council ranks as premier; the other members are the Attorney-General, the Provincial Secretary and Receiver-General, the Surveyor-General, the Commissioner of Works, the Solicitor-General, and three other members of the Assembly holding no office. The little province of Prince Edward's Island has a similar constitution. It has its elective Council and Assembly, and an Executive Council, consisting of the Attorney-General, a Secretary and Treasurer in one, a Commissioner of Public Works, and seven official members.

British Columbia has abandoned the double chamber, and reduced its officials to the lowest possible number consistent with efficiency. It has a Legislative Assembly of 24 members, among whom the Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works, the Attorney-General, the Provincial Secretary, and the Minister of Finance, form the Executive Council. The Provincial Secretary also performs the functions of Minister of Mines, while the Minister of Finance is also Minister of Agriculture.

Newfoundland, which has not joined the Canadian Dominion, has had since 1855 a government of its own on the responsible principle. Its legislative bodies are a Council and a House of Assembly, both of which are elected by household suffrage. The Executive Council consists of the Attorney-General, who ranks as premier, the Receiver-General, the Colonial Secretary, the Surveyor-General, and four members of the legislature holding no office.

From the North American colonies we pass to those of the Australian group, including Tasmania, New Zealand, and Fiji. These colonies are eight in number; of the five colonies on the Australian Continent, Western

Australia remains a Crown colony. In the rest, as well as in Tasmania and New Zealand, we have all the machinery of Responsible Government, but without the complication of a superior Federal government, as in Canada. Each of the colonies of this group is independent in all respects of all the others.

In all the Australian colonies, except Victoria, the principal Minister of State, who forms the Cabinet, and in this respect occupies the same position as the First Lord of the Treasury in England, is the "Secretary." With him rests the main responsibility in matters legislative as well as executive; but he has special duties, which are almost identical with the united duties of the Secretaries of State in the English Government. He is responsible for the volunteer force which constitutes the colonial army, and for the colonial navy. He conducts the foreign correspondence of the government, which takes place chiefly with the neighbouring colonies. To these comparatively light duties he adds that care of the whole internal administration which falls on the Home Secretary in England. He looks after the police, the gaols, lunatic asylums, reformatories, and public hospitals, and generally all matters of internal administration which fall under the care of no other department. In New South Wales and Queensland, the head of the Government is called the "Colonial Secretary;" in South Australia and Tasmania he is called "Chief Secretary."

In New South Wales nine other ministers are associated with the Colonial Secretary to form a Cabinet. These are the Vice-President, the Colonial Treasurer, the Ministers of Justice and of Public Instruction, the Secretaries for Lands, Mines, and Public Works, the Post

master-General, and the Attorney-General. The Colonial Treasurer, who is also styled Secretary for Finance and Trade, is the most important minister after the Secretary, his functions corresponding with those of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer. For all measures of finance and commerce, public revenue, expenditure, and loans, this officer is responsible, and he regulates the incidence and collection of the taxes and the audit of the public accounts. Of the constitution of New South Wales some account has been given in the foregoing chapter.

South Australia has a Legislative Council and Assembly, the former consisting of 18 members, elected by electors having a property qualification, by ballot, and by the whole colony, which for this purpose forms one electoral district. Each legislative councillor holds his seat for twelve years, and six retire every four years. The Assembly, of 46 members, is elected by universal suffrage. The Ministry, or Executive Council, consists of the Chief Secretary, who ranks as premier, the Attorney-General, the Treasurer, Commissioner of Crown Lands and Immigration, the Commissioner of Public Works, and the Minister of Education. The Governor is the President, and the Chief Justice of the colony has a seat in the Executive Council.

Victoria has an elective Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly. The former will ultimately be composed of 42 members, who must possess freehold property of the value of £100 per annum, and who are elected by electors having a property or educational qualification, in fourteen provinces; the latter of 86 members, returned by 55 electoral districts. The Cabinet or Executive Council consists of nine members. It is formed by the

Attorney-General, who ranks as premier, and also fills the office of Treasurer; the other members are the Chief Secretary, who is also Minister of Education; the Solicitor-General, the Commissioner of Trade and Customs, the Minister of Mines, the President of the Board of Land and Works, the Commissioner of Railways, the Minister of Public Works, and the Postmaster-General.

Tasmania has a Legislative Council of 10 members, and a Legislative Assembly of 32 members, both elected by electors possessing a property or educational qualification. Each councillor sits for six years; the Legislative Assembly has an extreme duration of five. The Executive Council consists of the Attorney-General, who ranks as premier, the Chief Secretary, the Treasurer, the Minister of Lands and Works and one non-official member.

Queensland, like New South Wales, has a Legislative Council of nominees; and, as in New South Wales, the councillors hold office for life. Their number is 11. The Assembly consists of 51 members. The Executive Council consists of the Colonial Secretary, who ranks as premier, the Attorney-General, Secretary for Public Works and Mines, Treasurer, Secretary for Lands, and Postmaster-General.

The present constitution of New Zealand closely follows those of New South Wales and Queensland. The legislative councillors (43 in number) are nominated and sit for life. The House of Representatives consists of 88 members, of whom four are elected by the Maori natives. The Executive Council consists of eight members, the premier being the Attorney-General. The others are the Treasurer, who is also Commissioner of

Stamp Duties and Minister of Marine; the Minister for Lands, Immigration, and Mines; the Colonial Secretary, who is also Minister of Education and Postmaster-General; the Minister of Justice; the Minister of Public Works; the Minister for Native Affairs and Defence; and one non-official member.

The colonies of Western Australia and Fiji, which belong to the Australian group, have not been invested with Responsible Government. In the case of Western Australia, the reason lies in the scattered character of the settlements, which fringe a coast-line of enormous length, and in the scantiness of the population. This colony has a composite Legislative Council, consisting of seven nominated and fourteen elected members, who are elected by electors possessing a property qualification. The government is administered by an Executive Council, of which the Governor is the head, the other members being the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Colonial Treasurer, the Surveyor-General, and the Director of Public Works. Fiji remains a Crown colony partly in virtue of its undeveloped character, but chiefly because the great mass of the population consists of natives, on whom it is impossible to confer the franchise, because if they had votes they would all vote exactly as about half-a-dozen chiefs might enjoin them. Fiji is therefore governed by an Executive Council consisting of the Governor, the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Receiver-General, the Commissioner of Lands, and the Chairman of the Lands Commission; and this council, with the addition of eight nominee members and the Chief Justice, forms the Legislative Council.

The only colony outside the North American and Australian groups which has obtained autonomy is the Cape Colony. This colony has a Legislative Council of 22 members, elected for seven years, and a House of Assembly of 72 members, both houses being elected by electors possessing a property qualification. The Governor is president of the Executive Council, which consists of the Cabinet plus several non-official members. The Cabinet consists of the Attorney-General, the Colonial Secretary, who is the Premier, the Treasurer, the Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works, and the Secretary for Native Affairs.

All the colonies of South Africa, with the exception of the Boer Free States, as they are called, and of Natal, have now been incorporated with the Cape Colony; and Natal, though a Crown colony, nearly approximates to free, though not to Responsible, government. The Legislative Council is of the "composite" type, containing 23 members elected by electors possessing a property qualification. These hold their seats for four years, unless the council is previously dissolved by the Lieutenant-Governor. The Colonial Secretary, Treasurer, and Engineer, the Attorney-General, and the Secretary for Native Affairs, have seats in the Legislative Council in right of office; and the same officials, with the addition of the Chief Justice, the Commandant of the Troops, and two members of the Legislative Council, make up the Executive Council.

In connexion with South Africa, something should be said of the so-called "Free-States" of the Orange River and the Transvaal. These districts are occupied partly by natives and partly by lawless Europeans of mixed

race, chiefly Dutch, whose ancestors have emigrated in past times from the Cape Colony, and who are therefore called "Boers." Though the land which they inhabit belongs to Great Britain, so far as any civilised power has claims to it, and though they themselves are legally subjects of the British Crown, they have practically cast off England, and England has practically cast off them. In both districts the British Government has made the attempt to introduce law and order among them, chiefly for the sake of the natives, whom they treat with the grossest cruelty, and has desisted from the attempt as hopeless. England has enough work upon her hands; but it is very questionable whether this was an obligation which she was justified in renouncing. However, for the present, it has been deliberately renounced; and these so-called "Free-States" are each governed, if the expression can be admitted, by a President and Popular Council (*Volksraad*) of their own choosing.

Of the Crown colonies, by far the most important is Ceylon, which is in fact an insular fragment of India. Though belonging not to the Indian, but to the Colonial Empire, its administration is of the Indian type. It is divided into seven provinces, in each of which there resides a government agent. It is governed by a Governor and an Executive Council, consisting of the Lieutenant-Governor, who is also Colonial Secretary, the Commander of the Forces, the Queen's Advocate, the Treasurer, and the Auditor-General. The Legislative Council consists of the Executive Council, with the addition of the Government Agents of the two principal provinces, the Surveyor-General, the Collector of Customs; and five additional members, who are nominated by the Governor.

The Legislative Council passes ordinances, which have the force of statute law within the colony. In money bills the Governor has the initiative; and no resolution affecting the revenue is entertainable by the Council unless proposed by the Governor.

The four colonies of Penang with Province Wellesley, Perak, Malacca, and Singapore, all on the Peninsula of Malacca, constitute a single government by the name of the "Straits Settlements." They belonged to India until 1867, and, like Ceylon, are administered in the Indian manner. The Governor, who resides at Singapore, is assisted by an Executive Council, who, as in Ceylon, also form a majority of the Legislative Council. The Executive Council, besides the Governor, consists of the officer in command of the troops, the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Treasurer, the Auditor-General, and the Colonial Engineer, together with the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang, and the Resident Councillor of Malacca. The Legislative Council consists of the same persons, with the addition of the Chief Justice, and of six unofficial nominee members.

The government of Hong-Kong is framed on the same principle. The officer in command of the troops, the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General, and the Surveyor-General, together with the Governor, form the Executive Council; the Legislative Council includes in addition the Chief Justice, and four unofficial members.

In Mauritius, as in Malta, the Legislative Council is styled the "Council of Government." The Executive Council consists of the Governor, the officer in command of the troops, the Colonial Secretary, the Procureur or Advocate-General, the Receiver-General, and the Auditor-



General, and the same persons, with the addition of three minor officials and of eight nominated members, form the Council of Government. The Seychelles Islands, a dependency of Mauritius, are administered by a Chief Civil Commissioner under the instructions of the Governor and Council of Mauritius.

The colonies on the western coast of the African Continent are divided into two distinct governments—(1) the Gold Coast Colony, and (2) the West Africa Settlements.

(1.) The Gold Coast proper consists of the seaboard of the kingdom of Ashanti. The territory of Lagos, lying to the east of the Gold Coast, and now incorporated under the same government, consists of parts of the seaboard of the kingdom of Yoruba. These settlements are administered by a Governor and an Executive Council, consisting of the Administrator of Lagos, the Queen's Advocate, the Colonial Secretary, the Treasurer, and the Officer Commanding the troops. The same persons, with the addition of the Chief Justice, constitute the Legislative Council.

(2.) The West Africa settlements also consist of two separate colonies—(1) the Gambia River, (2) Sierra Leone, with British Sherbro and the Isles de Los. The Governor-in-Chief resides at Sierra Leone; under him acts the Administrator of the Gambia. Each group has its separate Legislative Council, consisting of the principal officials and of nominated unofficial members—three in that of Sierra Leone, and one in that of the Gambia. The Executive Council of Sierra Leone, which is identical with the Legislative Council in all but the unofficial members, consists, besides the Governor, of the Chief Jus-

tice, the Colonial Secretary and Treasurer, and the Officer Commanding the forces.

St. Helena is administered by a Governor, assisted by an Executive Council, consisting of the Officer Commanding the troops, the bishop, and the sheriff. There is no Legislative Council.

Certain colonial possessions in Europe complete the list of British Colonies in the Old World. They are four in number—Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus, in the Mediterranean, and Heligoland in the German Ocean. The three possessions in the Mediterranean are held for the purpose of retaining the naval command of that sea, both as an important field of British commerce and as the route to India. Gibraltar is merely a fortress, and remains under a military governor, who is hampered by no council, executive or legislative. The Governor of Malta is assisted by an Executive Council of three members. There is also a "Council of Government," consisting of the Officer Commanding the troops, the Chief Secretary, the Crown Advocate, the Auditor-General, the Collector of Customs, of four minor officials, and of eight unofficial members elected for a term of five years, by electors having a property qualification. Heligoland and Cyprus are each governed by a Governor, assisted by a nominee Executive Council.

The West Indies and adjacent possessions on the American Continent within the tropics, together with Bermuda and the Falklands, make up the total of the colonies. In the West Indian Islands there are five governments-in-chief—(1) Jamaica, (2) Trinidad, (3) the Bahamas, (4) the Windward Islands, (5) the Leeward Islands. Each of the two last groups consists of several

separate colonies. The Windward Islands are Barbados, St. Vincent, Grenada, Tobago, and St. Lucia. Each island is a separate colony, having its own constitution and government, but the Governor of Barbados is Governor-in-Chief of the whole group, the remaining islands having each a Lieutenant-Governor or Administrator. The Leeward Islands are Antigua, Montserrat, St. Kitts, Nevis, Dominica, and the Virgin Islands. Since 1871 these have constituted a single Federal colony, of which the several islands are denominated Presidencies. Besides these island governments, the colonies of British Guiana and British Honduras, on the Continent, belong to the West Indian group; while the Bermudas, forming a single colonial government under the name of Bermuda, lie between the West Indies and Canada. Falkland Islands, another group far away to the south, form another. All these are Crown Colonies.

Jamaica is governed by a Legislative Council, consisting of nine official and nine non-official nominee members. The official councillors are the Lieutenant-Governor, who is also the Colonial Secretary, the Officer Commanding the troops, the Attorney-General, the Surveyor-General, the Collector-General, the Assistant Colonial Secretary, and three minor officials. The four first-named officials, together with some nominee members, who are not to exceed eight in number, constitute the Governor's executive council, under the style of the "Privy Council."

The Government of Trinidad is very similar to that of Jamaica. The Legislative Council consists of the Governor, six official members, and eight nominee non-official members. The official members are the Chief Justice, the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Re-

ceiver-General, the Solicitor-General, and the Agent General of Immigrants. The Executive Council consists of three members only, besides the Governor. These are the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General, and the Officer Commanding the troops.

The Bahamas, like Barbados and Bermuda, still retain their two legislative chambers. They have a Legislative Council of 9 members and a Representative Assembly of 29, elected by electors possessing a property qualification. The Executive Council consists of the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Officer Commanding the troops, the Receiver-General, and 5 other members nominated from the legislative chambers.

Barbados has a Legislative Council of 8 members, appointed by the Crown, and holding office during the Queen's pleasure. It has also a House of Assembly, consisting of 24 members, two for each parish on the island, who are elected annually by members having a property qualification. The Executive Council consists of the Governor, the Officer Commanding the troops, the Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Auditor-General, and two non-official members. Besides the Executive Council there is in Barbados an "Executive Committee" of the Legislature, established for the purpose of more completely controlling the executive. This consists of the Governor, who acts as chairman, the members of the Executive Council, one member of the Legislative Council, and four members of Assembly appointed by the Governor. Before money bills can be introduced to the Legislature it is necessary that they shall have passed the Executive Committee; and this Committee also assists the Governor in framing the estimates.

St. Vincent, the second colony of the Windward group, is administered by a Lieutenant-Governor, who is also the Colonial Secretary, and acts under the Governor of Barbados as Governor-in-Chief. The legislative power is vested since 1877 in a Legislative Council, composed of the Lieutenant-Governor, the Attorney-General, the Treasurer, and three non-official members nominated by the Crown. The Executive Council is similarly constituted. Grenada, like St. Vincent, is administered by a Lieutenant-Governor, and Legislative and Executive Councils nominated by the Crown. Tobago and Santa Lucia have similar governments, the head being denominated Administrator and Colonial Secretary.

The Leeward Islands—including Antigua, St. Kitts, Dominica, Nevis, Montserrat, and the Virgin Islands—form a single colony, under a Governor, an Executive Council nominated by the Crown, and consisting of the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Auditor-General, the Presidents of St. Kitts, Dominica, Montserrat, and Nevis, and ten unofficial members, and a general Legislative Council of 18 members. Nine of these are elective, and nine non-elective. Of the former, four are taken from the Island Council of Antigua, two from the Legislative Assembly of Dominica, and three from the unofficial members of the Legislative Council of St. Kitts. The nominee members are the President, who must be a member of some Island Council, the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Auditor-General, and five unofficial members, one of which is taken from each of the Island Council of Dominica, St. Kitts, Nevis, Montserrat, and the Virgin Islands. Each of the six Presidencies has its own President, Executive Council,

and Legislative Council, the members of the former being appointed by the Crown. The Island Legislative Council of Antigua consists of the Colonial Secretary, Attorney-General, Solicitor-General, the Treasurer, eight nominee members, and twelve elective members, elected by persons having a property qualification. St. Kitts, Montserrat, Nevis, and the Virgin Islands have Legislative Councils of Crown nominees, partly official and partly unofficial. Dominica has a Legislative Assembly of fourteen members, half of whom are nominated by the Crown and half elected by persons having a property qualification.

The government of British Guiana occupies a peculiar position among the Colonial Governments. It is derived from the old Dutch government, and consists of the Governor, the Court of Policy, and the Combined Court. The general powers of government are vested in the Governor and the Court of Policy, which consists of five official members—the Attorney-General, the Government Secretary, the Auditor-General, and the Agent-General for Immigration, and five elective members. These are elected by the combined action of an electoral college of seven members, elected for life, and of the Court of Policy. On the occasion of each vacancy the College of Electors proposes two candidates to fill it, one of whom is chosen by the Court of Policy. The seven members of the Electoral College are elected in five electoral districts, and in the same districts are elected the Financial Representatives, who are six in number, the district of Essequibo returning two. The Financial Representatives sit with the Court of Policy for purposes of finance and taxation, and the body thus constituted is called the Combined Court.

British Honduras is a pure Crown colony, the Executive Council and the Legislative Council of five official and four or more non-official members being nominated by the Crown. The head of the Government is styled the Lieutenant-Governor, a title dating from the time when the colony was a dependency of Jamaica.

Bermuda retains its old form of free government. It is administered by a Governor and a Privy Council of ten members, which are nominated by the Crown, and who also constitute the Legislative Council. Besides these, there is a House of Assembly of thirty-six members, each of the nine parishes of the colony returning four members. The electors must possess freehold property of a certain value.

The Falkland Islands have a Legislative and an Executive Council, both appointed by the Crown.

The revenue and expenditure of each of the colonies are controlled by the legislative bodies. In colonies having Responsible Government the Home Government never interferes with the action of the colonial legislatures in this respect, it being understood that those who grant and pay taxes are entitled to dispose of them when raised. The legislatures of the Crown colonies also vote and dispose of their own public revenues. Their public debts are as a rule insignificant, and they raise the fund to meet the expenses of government without difficulty. To this there are some exceptions. Western Australia, a scantily-peopled and backward colony, receives a grant of £15,000 a-year from the Home Government in aid of its expenditure. But most of the Crown colonies, including the West Indies and Natal, cost the Home Government nothing.

All the Responsible Government colonies have public debts which in some cases are very heavy. But inasmuch as colonies are only founded where there is abundance of cultivable soil, every colony to begin with has a large public capital in the shape of land. The most obvious means of developing a colony consists in selling this land to immigrants, and investing the proceeds in the formation of roads and railways to enable them to reach it. For this purpose the country must be surveyed; sites must be selected for towns, townships, and farms, the lots must be laid out; roads and bridges, and on the coast harbours and lighthouses, must be constructed. Nor can the colonial government withdraw its hand even when local government has begun. It has to assist the municipalities in establishing prisons, penitentiaries, lunatic asylums, cemeteries, and other necessary public institutions. Money must be raised for these purposes, and thus every colony which intends to develop its resources must necessarily start with a public debt. Provision has to be made for the interest on this debt; and in most colonies this interest forms a heavy item of expenditure. But the returns from the public works of the colony have to be set off against this interest; and as population increases, these returns increase in proportion. There can therefore be no doubt of the soundness of the principle on which the colonies have incurred their public debts. As the colony advances in prosperity, the value of the public works must necessarily increase; and in Australia the time is anticipated when the profit which they yield will pay a very large part, if not the whole, of the expenses of government.

But at present the Australias are far from realising



this anticipation, and in Canada it seems never likely to be realised at all. The prosperity of Canada depends mainly on the improvement of the means of communication; and this requires to be pursued more extensively than at present, in order to attract a more numerous population. Canada is already saddled with a heavy debt. Its public revenue is mainly derived from heavy import and excise duties. As most of the land in Canada is disposed of by free grants, the sales of the Dominion lands are insignificant, compared with the land sales in Australia; and at present the public works yield but a small return. The chief public works are under the charge of the Dominion Government. One public enterprise of high importance, the Intercolonial Railway, which connects the valley of the St. Lawrence with the harbour of Halifax, Nova Scotia, is already completed; and the great Pacific Railway, connecting the St. Lawrence with British Columbia, is in process of construction under the Dominion Government. When this railway is complete, many years must elapse before the settlements which it will facilitate can be formed, and the Dominion can reap the benefit of its construction.

The revenues of the Australian colonies are mainly derived from three sources—1. The sale and rent of public lands; 2. Customs duties; 3. The receipts from the public works of the colony, its railways, telegraphs, and harbours. Public works are everywhere the heaviest item of expenditure, the expenses of administration being comparatively small. In New South Wales one-half of the revenue is derived from the sale of land. Such a method of raising revenue looks very like living on the

capital of the country. But this disappears when the large proportion invested in public works is borne in mind. The railways alone in Victoria already defray nearly one-third of the public expenditure. The customs duties are, as in Canada, the principal item of actual taxation. To tax imports has the effect of protecting native industries at the consumers' expense, but it is practically the only means of raising revenue in a country where the population is widely scattered. Direct taxation chiefly exists in the shape of mining and depasturing licences and assessments; in other forms it cannot well be introduced until these colonies are more densely peopled.

In the Cape Colony the principal source of revenue is the import duties. Large tracts of public land are open for purchase, but very little is taken up. The chief item of expenditure is the interest on the public debt. In the revenue and expenditure of the Crown colonies, as a rule, there is little of special interest. Import duties are the principal item of revenue; the rest is made up of excise duties on liquors, stamps, and licences.

The civil laws of the various colonies exhibit a great variety. Every colonial legislature has the power to alter its laws with the consent of the Crown; but in colonies which have been acquired by conquest the original laws have in most cases been allowed to subsist as a basis. Thus, in Lower Canada, and in St. Lucia, and other West Indian islands taken from France, the basis of the law is the old common law of France; in Malta and Mauritius, the Code Napoléon; in the Cape Colony, Ceylon, and British Guiana, the basis is the Roman-Dutch law. In the original colonies of England, just as in the United States, the basis is the common law of

England, and the main principles of legal theory and practice are identical in all. But the legal structures which have been raised on this common basis are widely different, having necessarily been adapted to the varying needs of each colony. The laws of the several colonies are regarded in English courts, like the laws of Scotland, Jersey, and the Isle of Man, as foreign law. From the Supreme Courts, however, of all the colonies, an appeal lies to the Queen in Council ; and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, sitting in London, reviews judicial decisions from all the colonies, applying to each case the particular colonial law under which it comes.

THE END.

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